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S INCE 1955, the United States international air transport industry' has
shifted from a predominant reliance on piston driven aircraft to reliance
on jets. And, having passed the financial crisis which resulted from the
transition to jets, the international carriers look forward to what one
writer calls the "fat years" of commercial air transport.! Thus, from a
strictly commercial point of view, America's international air transport
industry is at the dawn of an unparalleled decade of success. However,
the current operations of the industry are not completely free from
problems. The $100 million profit received by the industry during 1963
was realized despite the fact that, on the average international flight,
almost half the available seats were empty. Of the 20.3 billion passenger
seat miles provided by the international carriers during the year, about
47% were not utilized.' The American public and the press in general
apparently judge the success of the industry mainly in terms of its com-
mercial achievements. Thus extensive overcapacity does not appear to be
a significant problem in the eyes of the general public and the press as
long as growing profits are received by the air carriers. Such a view,
however, is obviously based on an unawareness of alternative standards
by which to judge the industry's operations.
The role of international civil aviation in the modern world is held
by many writers to be a crucial determinant of the nature of cultural
relations between individual nations; and amiability between nations, a
'The concern here is with the operations of scheduled, international passenger/cargo carriers.
In Part II below, the carriers included in the international air transport industry (as that industry
is defined in this study) will be listed.
2Business Week, 28 March 1964, p. 52, 55.
'CAB, OFFICE OF CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, AIR CARRIER ANALYTICAL CHARTS 10-
12 (Dec. 1963). The term "unutilized capacity" plays a prominent role throughout this study, and
this prominence demands a strict definition of the term. Thus, except when it is indicated other-
wise, "unutilized capacity," "overcapacity," or "excess capacity" refers to any situation where
empty seat miles are flown by scheduled international air transport carriers.
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few of which unfortunately harbor the capacity to destroy the rest, is
of no little importance. The idea that a growing number of international
air transport passengers can facilitate friendly international relations has
been expressed eloquently by Professor Joseph Schenkman, a leading
authority on international civil aviation. According to Professor Schenk-
man:
Aviation is, of course, a new form of making contact with people of
states and governments. This is a factor of primary importance in facilitat-
ing diplomacy.
Aviation in its international form makes possible the swift interchange of
ideas and facilitates high policy decisions by heads of states in face to face
conferences. This has contributed increasingly to establishing modern methods
of diplomatic conduct by conferences.
From the point of view of international relations in the broadest sense,
the more the peoples of the world are able to move around and see other
ways of life, the more quickly shall we arrive at an age of peace and plenty.4
Because this writer agrees that social intercourse between nations (in
modern times to a considerable extent dependent on civil aviation) is a
desirable goal,' the dual purpose of this article is (1) to call attention to
the growing volume of overcapacity being flown by the United States
international air transport industry, and (2) to discuss alternative pro-
posals aimed at the reduction of such overcapacity.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY AND A DEFINITION
OF THE INDUSTRY
The most complex aspect of the United States international air trans-
port industry is the fact that each carrier must make its operations com-
patible with the rules of three separate organizations: the Civil Aeronautics
Board; the United States Department of State; and the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). In fact, a discussion of any single aspect
of overcapacity in the industry cannot be understood adequately unless
it is prefaced by an analysis of the industry's relation to the organizations
which exert control over its operations. Part II of this article provides
such an analysis.
Part III describes in considerable detail the extent to which overcapacity
(1) has been generated by individual United States carriers, and (2) exists
in specific geographic areas. Part IV delineates the chief causes of the re-
4 SCHENKMAN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 6 (1955). Recently, there has
been considerable evidence lending support to the argument that cultural contacts can facilitate
peace between hostile nations. As a case in point, the relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union are considered by most observers as more amenable to peace than has been the case
since 1945. No doubt, this new rapport with the Soviet Union has been facilitated by the growing
number of personal contacts between Americans and Russians made possible by modern aviation
technology.
' The writer admits the subjectivity of the basic value judgment upon which this study is based.
In a market oriented society like the United States, it is perhaps a mild heresy to deny that revenue
and cost data are the only factors upon which an industry's operations can be evaluated. In any
case, the admission that the value judgment made is subjective provides ample opportunity for other
writers to evaluate the industry on the basis of other criteria.
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cent growth of overcapacity. Finally, Part V will contain alternative
proposals timed at a reduction of the wasted capacity generated by the
world international air transport industry.'
The international air transport industry is defined here as consisting of
the operations of United States air carriers which provide scheduled pas-
senger services between this country and foreign nations. It must be
pointed out that this definition excludes the following seven United States
carriers, which are defined by the CAB as "international and territorial,
passenger/cargo carriers": Alaska Airlines, Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines,
Mackey Airlines, Pacific Northern Airlines, South Pacific Air Lines, Trans-
Caribbean Airways, and United Air Lines. The operations of these carriers
have been excluded because each can be included in one of the two follow-
ing groups:
(1) Interstate carriers-this group, providing service between cities in
the continental United States and Alaska or Hawaii, includes Alaska
Airlines, Pacific Northern Airlines, and United Air Lines.7
(2) International carriers with limited, local service operations-the
services of these carriers, though international, are confined to local service
in limited geographical areas. Carriers in this group are: Caribbean-
Atlantic Airlines, Mackey Airlines, South Pacific Air Lines, and Trans-
Caribbean Airways.8
For the benefit of the reader who questions the exclusion of the seven
carriers listed above, it may be noted that, in 1963, the services of the
seven airlines comprised less than 5 % of the total revenue passenger
miles flown by United States carriers on international routes.! More im-
portant, because of the geographical limitations of their operations, these
carriers are not subject to the same framework of regulation as are the
nine carriers which make up the international air transport industry under
scrutiny, a point which will become clear in Part II.
Thus, the specific definition of the "United States international air
transport industry," to be used in this study, involves only the following
nine carriers:1" American Airlines, Braniff Airways, Delta Air Lines, East-
ern Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Pan American-Grace Airways (Pa-
' Throughout this essay, the "international air transport industry" refers to the group of United
States carriers defined below; the "world international air transport industry" refers to the opera-
tions of all international carriers.
United Air Lines also provides flights from Seattle to Vancouver, B.C. Nonetheless the limited
international operations of United comprise but a small fraction of the operations of the total in-
dustry, thus United is defined here as a "domestic" operator.
' Since 1 January 1964, Pan American Airways has been conducting South Pacific's operations
in the south Pacific region. Effective 1 April 1964, the CAB granted South Pacific's route certificate
to Pan American. See South Pacific-Pan American Route Transfer Case, CAB Docket No. 14847,
(21 April 1964).
' Compiled from CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICs 34-41 (2 Dec. 1963).
10 Part of the operations of four of these carriers cannot be defined strictly as "international."
Nonetheless, the noninternational operations of the four carriers are but a relatively small portion
of the total operations of the industry. Therefore, for purposes of this study, the following inter-
state and territorial operations will be defined as international operations: (1) Pan American services
between (a) the United States and Hawaii and (b) Pan American services between Seattle and
Fairbanks, Alaska; (2) Eastern and Delta services between the United States and Puerto Rico; and
(3) Northwest services from the west coast to Alaska and Hawaii.
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nagra), Pan American World Airways (Pan American), Trans World
Airlines (TWA), and Western Air Lines.
II. REGULATION OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
A. The Civil Aeronautics Board
This analysis of the Board's regulatory control over the international
air transport industry is brief, since a general knowledge on the part of
the reader of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 19581 is
assumed. The sole purpose here is to review those parts of titles I, IV,
VIII, and X of the act which are especially relevant to the present study.
The most important feature of title I is incorporated in section 102,
which charges the Board with both "promotion" and "regulation" of
civil aeronautics in the United States. The Board must see to it that the
carriers charge "reasonable" rates without "unjust discriminations or
prejudices." These goals are to be realized concurrently with "sound
economic conditions" in the industry, free from the evil of "destructive
competition." In achieving this broad and idealistic policy in the inter-
national industry, the Board's task is twofold: first, it must control the
operations of United States carriers operating abroad; and, second, the
Board must regulate foreign air carriers operating routes to or within
the United States or its territories. The rules for accomplishing this monu-
mental task are outlined in titles IV, VIII, and X.
The principal provisions of title IV are section 401, which empowers
the Board to control entry into the United States international air trans-
port industry, and section 402, which stipulates that no foreign carrier
can fly into American cities without Board certification. Section 401 (e) (2)
of the act further states that insofar as United States international carriers
are concerned,
[The Board shall] designate the terminal and intermediate points only
insofar as the Board shall deem practicable, and otherwise shall designate
only the general route or routes to be followed....
Section 412 states that every air carrier shall file with the Board a true
copy of every contract or agreement affecting air transportation to which
the carriers become a party. This provision is of considerable importance
to the international carriers, for it gives the Board the right to pass on
any IATA agreement into which the carriers may enter.
Title VIII defines the Board's relationship to other administrative
agencies. Of particular importance are sections 801 and 802. The former
states that the issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, sus-
1172 Stat. 788 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1964). For the complete text of the 19-58
Act (as amended through July 1963) and related statutes, see CAB, AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND
RELATED MATERIALS (1963). For the legislative history of the Act, see SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 86TH CONG.. 1ST SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958 (Comm. Print 1959). For a comprehensive review of legislation
affecting air transport, see Lindsey, The Legislative Development of Civil Aviation 1938-1958, 28
J. AIR L. & COM. 18 (1961-62).
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pension, or revocation of any certificate authorizing an air carrier to en-
gage in overseas or foreign air transportation, shall be subject to the
approval of the President; the latter section makes it mandatory that the
Secretary of State consult with the Board before effecting any aviation
agreement with a foreign nation.
According to section 1002 (d) of title X, when the Board judges that a
fare set by an air carrier is "or will be unjust or unreasonable, or un-
justly discriminatory, or unduly preferential . . ." the Board may:
determine and prescribe the lawful rate, fare, or charge (or the maximum
or minimum, or the maximum and minimum thereof) thereafter to be ...
charged .... Provided, That as to rates, fares, and charges for overseas air
transportation, the Board shall determine and prescribe only a just and
reasonable maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum rate, fare, or
charge.
Finally, section 1002(g) gives the Board the additional power to suspend
any new rate set by any air carrier until a hearing concerning the "reason-
ableness" of the rate can be held."5
B. The Executive Branch Of The Federal Government
Though the CAB has principal control over domestic air transporta-
tion, the Board shares the job of regulating international air transport
with the Executive Branch of the Federal government. Prior to 1943," the
role of the Department of State was less clearly defined than it is presently.
During that period, the Department ordinarily played a passive role in
route development, leaving the job to the single operating United States
international carrier, Pan American Airways. However, after World War
II, recognizing the crucial political and commercial importance of inter-
national air transport, the United States, as well as most other nations,
made the negotiation and development of international routes a govern-
mental task rather than one to be undertaken solely by private airlines.14
In fact, the present role of the Executive Branch (especially that of the
Department of State) cannot be understood without discussion of the
1943-1946 period during which the framework for the postwar develop-
ment of international aviation was established.
In 1944, the United States invited fifty-four countries to send delegates
to Chicago to discuss the problems of postwar development of interna-
tional aviation. 5 The two most powerful countries at the Chicago Con-
" As we shall discover, the Board's power over international fares is severely limited by the
terms of bilateral air transport agreements with foreign governments.
13 On 2 December 1943, the CAB issued a memorandum to all holders of public convenience
and necessity stating that thenceforth the Department of State would secure all commercial rights
for international air transport services provided by United States carriers.
14 Between 1919 and 1940 the Department of State had negotiated only eight bilateral aviation
agreements. Yet, during the 1940-1955 period, this country became a party to some fifty such
agreements. For the most informative description of the development of international routes be-
tween 1919 and the end of World War II, see H. SMITH, AIRWAYS ABROAD (1950).
15 Every nation in the world was represented except the Axis States, Argentina, Saudi Arabia,
and the Soviet Union. The absence of delegates from the Soviet Union made a truly international
aviation policy impossible. To the present time the United States has effected no bilateral agreement
with the Soviet Union, nor with any of its satellites. There is evidence, however, that the future
will require further negotiations with Russia since that country has developed an airline on the
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ference were, of course, Britain and the United States, and the outcome
of the Conference represented a compromise between the positions taken
by these two countries. The United States advocated "freedom of the
air" and interpreted this to mean that competition, unfettered by an
international regulatory agency, should be maintained on the world's air
routes. The United States was especially opposed to restrictions on fifth
freedom traffic (the right of Country A to pick up passengers in Country
B and transport them to a third or fourth country) and maintained that
such rights were necessary for the operation of long distance world-wide
routes. Thus, the American delegation to the Conference favored the
adoption of a multilateral convention granting fifth freedom rights to
all signatory nations. This position taken by the American delegation was
similar to that taken by the proverbial elephant, who, while he danced
through the chicken yard, cried "everyone for himself."
Opposing the American position were those countries advocating a more
restrictive policy because they feared that in open competition the United
States industry could easily dominate the postwar international air trans-
port market. Two countries, Britain and Canada, favored an international
agency (modeled after the CAB) with economic powers over routes, fares,
capacity, and frequencies. While other policy positions were mentioned by
others at Chicago," these were of little importance since delegations of
the United States and Britain dominated the Conference.
Because of United States hostility towards the creation of any economic
regulatory body, provisions concerning regulation over capacity, fre-
quencies, or rates were omitted from any of the documents produced at
the Conference. In fact, it appeared for a while that the Conference
might be a total failure since no point of agreement could be reached be-
tween the British and the Americans. However, at the last minute, the
Netherlands delegation produced a compromise aimed at finding just such
a point of agreement between the delegations. The Netherlands delegation
suggested the adoption of the "Air Transit Agreement," which would
provide first and second freedoms (the right to cross the airspace above a
foreign country, and the right to land in a foreign country for non-
commercial reasons) to all signatory nations. The "Air Transit Agree-
ment" proved popular, and the majority of the delegates promised that
they would urge their respective governments to ratify it.
Having thus discovered a point of agreement, the delegates then pro-
ceeded to produce six separate documents aimed at the facilitation of
scale of Pan American. For a discussion of Aeroflot (the State monopoly airline of the Russian Gov-
ernment), see Heymann, The Soviet Role in International Civil Aviation, 25 J. AIR L. & CoM.
265 (1958), and Porch, Aeroflot, the Soviet Airline-at Home and Abroad, 30 J. AIR L. & COM.
193 (1964).
" The most interesting was the plan jointly sponsored by Australia and New Zealand which
called for international ownership and control of international airlines. This plan would have elimi-
nated competition on international routes. Needless to say, the Australia-New Zealand plan was
unacceptable to both the British and the United States and was thus ignored. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the various proposals brought forth at the Conference, see SCHENKMAN, Op. cit. supra
note 4, at 82-92. For an alternative proposal for world operation of the international air transport
industry, see COOPER, INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF WORLD AIR TRANSPORT
(1948).
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postwar civil aviation. 7 Appendix I to the Final Act was the "Interim
Agreement on International Aviation" which created the Provisional
International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO). The main tasks of
PICAO were to gather information and disseminate it to the various
governments, to coordinate the activities of the countries signing any of
the other conventions adopted at the Conference, and to act as arbiter
between disagreeing States. Appendix II of the Final Act made provisions
for an organization to supercede PICAO, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). This organization, which was created on 4 March
1947 when the 26th State ratified appendix II, presently has much the
same duties as those originally assigned to PICAO.
Appendix III of the Final Act (the "Air Transit Agreement") granted
first and second freedoms to signatory nations, while appendix IV (the
"International Air Transport Agreement") granted multilateral five free-
dom rights to signatory nations. Appendix IV embodied the United
States position, but did not prove popular: one year after the Confer-
ence only nine countries had ratified appendix IV." I
Appendix V contained a tentative set of twelve technical annexes aimed
at the standardization of several technical aspects of aviation including
airways systems, communications, and air traffic control. Schenkman has
argued that:
[I]t is generally agreed that the most important work accomplished by the
Chicago Conference is in the technical field. The international standards and
recommended practices, contained in the Annexes of the Convention, are a
remarkable success. An achievement of immense aid not only to pilots but
to air navigation as a whole, they make the possibility of safe flying a
reality."
The Final Act also included Resolution VIII, recommending a Form
of Standard Agreement for Provisional Air Routes, which it was hoped
would be used by countries effecting bilateral agreements after the Con-
ference. Within one year after the Conference, the United States, follow-
ing the standard prescribed by Resolution VIII, had concluded bilateral
agreements with Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, and
Portugal.
After the Conference, many nations still believed that the Chicago
meeting had been a failure, especially since no program for economic
control of international aviation had been adopted. Other delegations,
such as that of the United States, were disappointed because a multi-
lateral convention granting fifth freedom rights to all the representative
nations had not been adopted. Nonetheless, most writers are convinced
that the Chicago Conference was perhaps the most valuable international
civil aviation convention ever held. In adopting this position, Schenkman
stated that:
17 For the text of the Final Act of the Conference, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2282,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE-FINAL ACT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1945).
"' Because of the unpopularity of Appendix IV, the United States withdrew from the Air
Transport Agreement in 1946. See U.S. Withdraws from Air Transport Agreement, 15 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 236, 256 (4 Aug. 1946).
19 SCHENKIMAN, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 99.
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In the political history of commercial aviation the Chicago Conference
ranks as the most important ever held. This is not because of its accomplish-
ments, although they were impressive enough, but rather because of the
conviction on all sides that a way had to be found for appropriate inter-
national cooperation.2
H. L. Smith concurred with Schenkman:
Was the Chicago conference . . . successful . . .? In the midst of a weary
war half a hundred nations had sent representatives to work out one of the
vexatious problems of the peace. That in itself was -a remarkable achieve-
ment. If the delegates had merely stated their respective policies on world
air commerce the meeting would have justified the cost.21
At all events the Chicago Conference laid a firm framework for postwar
civil aviation and a framework much less ambiguous and more modern
than that existing prior to 1944.
Though of great importance in facilitating postwar commercial aviation,
the Chicago Conference did not alter the role of the Executive Branch
in regulating air transport in the United States as that role had been
established in the implementation of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
The procedure for route development still involved preliminary negotia-
tions by the Department of State for landing rights in foreign countries;
and, once landing rights were secured, the CAB still maintained the power
to grant route certificates to carriers flying between the United States and
foreign countries. In addition, the President retained his power to pass on
all such route certificates issued by the CAB. Nevertheless, the Chicago
Conference clarified the task of the Executive Branch during the postwar
period: after the Conference, the Department of State faced the long
and involved process of negotiating bilateral air transport agreements
with most of the world's nations.
In February 1946, the United States and Britain held negotiations in
Bermuda in order to draw up the first postwar bilateral air transport
agreement, an agreement which would make possible additional flights
between the United States and Europe. The "Bermuda Agreement" merits
special attention here, because the development of international routes
for this country (and for many other nations) has been based primarily
on "Bermuda-type" bilaterals."
The primary task facing the two delegations at Bermuda was to work
out some arrangement regarding landing privileges, rates, and capacity-
in short, the task was to construct an agreement concerning every sig-
nificant aspect of air transport between the two countries. The matter of
allowable capacity on designated routes was the first order of business at
Bermuda. First, the delegates attempted to devise mathematical formulae
which would specify the exact proportion of traffic flowing between the
two countries to be allotted to carriers of each nation. However, these
11ld. at 101.
21 H. SMITH, OP. Cit. supra note 14, at 191.
22 Air Transport Agreement With Great Britain, 11 Feb. 1946, 60 Stat. 1499, T.I.A.S. No.
1507 [hereinafter cited as Bermuda Agreement]. For a complete text of the Agreement, see 13
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 583-89 (12 April 1946).
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formulae were rejected for more general principles. When agreement was
finally reached, each nation was granted the right to determine, in the first
instance, the capacity to be offered and the number of frequencies to be
flown on routes designated in Annex III to the Agreement. The Final Act23
states that capacity offered by a carrier should be determined primarily
by the traffic demands "between the country of which such airline is a
national and the countries of ultimate destination." Thus capacity on
third and fourth freedom traffic (these two freedoms allow United States
carriers, for instance, to carry United States citizens to Britain, dispatch
them, and then carry British citizens back to the United States) was to
be roughly determined by the traffic flowing between the two countries.
The right to carry fifth freedom traffic was to be related:
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries
of designation;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes
after taking account of local and regional services."
According to these principles, fifth freedom traffic could be limited for
either of the two following reasons: (1) if the airlines of one nation,
while operating its trunkline services, "unduly affected" the other na-
tion's traffic on the same route; or (2) if capacity offered on fifth free-
dom flights adversely affected the "local and regional services" of the
other nation's carriers. The possibility of future restrictions on capacity,
however, did not mitigate the essential freedom of the capacity clauses,
for the United States had gained its most sought after privilege: fifth
freedom rights through Britain with capacity provisions, at least in the
first instance, to be determined by United States carriers. The Final Act
also required that, in the event either of the two nations became dis-
satisfied with the number of frequencies or capacity provided by the
other, it could beseech PICAO to arbitrate the difference in opinions.
To gain this concession regarding capacity limitations, however, the
United States was forced to grant concessions to the British in the form
of rate controls on flights between the two countries. The British were
aware that even if the United States demonstrated restraint in the amount
of capacity flown, American carriers could still monopolize traffic by cut-
throat rate reductions. From the British point of view, it was necessary
to conclude some agreement which would prohibit such a practice by
either country. Thus the Agreement states that each government will
accept, in the first instance, rates agreed on through the machinery of
the International Air Transport Association, which had been established
in April 1945. The United States agreed to accept this machinery for a
trial period of one year, and any new proposed rate to be charged by car-
riers of either country was thus subject to the approval of the aeronautical
2 The Bermuda Agreement refers to three separate documents, the following two of which are
important here: (I) a Final Act, primarily concerned with the matter of capacity; and (2) a
Bilateral Agreement concerned with rate control and route designation.
24 Bermuda Agreement, Final Act, para. 6.
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TABLE 1
EXCERPTS FROM ANNEX III TO THE BERMUDA AGREEMENT:
ROUTE PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO EACH COUNTRY
(a) Routes to be served by Air Carriers of The United Kingdom
(In both directions; stops for non-traffic purposes omitted)
Point of Departure Intermediate Points Destination in U.S. Points Beyond
Territory
(Any one or more of (Any one or more (Any one or more (Any one or more of the
the following) of the following, of the following, following, if desired)
if desired) if desired)
1. London New York San Francisco and the
points on Route 7.







(b) Routes to be served by Air Carriers of The United States
(In both directions; stops for non-traffic purposes omitted)
1. Chicago Gander London Amsterdam










Points in the Baltic coun-
tries
2. New York Gander London Brussels








A point in Iran
Beirut
A point in Syria
A point in Iraq




SOURcE: 14 DEP'T STATE BULL. 589-90 (1946).
[Vol. 32
OVERCAPACITY IN AIR TRANSPORT
authorities of both countries. At that time, the CAB did not have statu-
tory powers to set exact rates on international flights by United States
carriers or foreign carriers operating to the United States, being empowered
only to set maximum or minimum rates, or both. As a reflection of the
Board's lack of power in this area, paragraphs (c) through (j) of the
Agreement contain an elaborate procedure for establishing rates in the
event that one of the aeronautical authorities fails to ratify a rate agreed
to by IATA. s
Having come to terms on capacity limitations and rate making pro-
cedures, the two nations drew up an elaborate Annex III, specifying the
routes that air carriers of each country would be allowed to fly. Excerpts
from Annex III of the agreement are presented in Table I in order to illus-
trate better the conditions and complexities of a bilateral agreement.
Within a year after the Bermuda Conference, the United States had
become a party to bilateral air transport agreements with twenty-five
nations." Every one of these bilaterals granted five freedom rights to
American carriers. By 1963, the United States had entered into bilateral
agreements with sixty-eight countries, all of which currently operate
flights into the United States, or have the right to exercise that privilege."
It should be emphasized, however, that while most of the conditions
under which these foreign carriers are allowed to fly into the United States
are determined by "Bermuda-type" bilaterals, the terms of these bilaterals
may or may not extend privileges similar to those extended to Britain by
the Bermuda Agreement. By the same token, rights secured by the United
States in such bilaterals may differ from privileges secured from the
British. The precise terms of such a bilateral agreement depend upon several
factors. Among the most important factors are: (1) the transportation
needs of the two nations involved, (2) the relative bargaining strength
of each nation, and (3) the political relationship which exists between the
two nations at the time of bargaining. In other words, the agreements are
not identical.
In 1946, the United States signed a bilateral agreement with France
quite similar to that which had been negotiated with Britain at Bermuda,
differing primarily in the Annex which designated routes.8 In 1945, how-
ever, the United States had signed an agreement with Switzerland which
provided American carriers rights to operate to points in and beyond
Switzerland while, in return, the Swiss were only privileged to fly to
New York City and then back to Switzerland.2 ' A 1945 agreement with
25 Until 1962, there were no IATA rates which were not agreed to by both countries, thus the
machinery set up in paragraphs (c) through (j) was not utilized. There had been a brief skirmish
involving Pan American rates on transatlantic flights in 1945, but this problem was worked out
without the aid of the CAB. During 1963, however, the CAB refused to ratify rates established by
the IATA in October 1962 and this caused a mild crisis in international air transport. This issue is
discussed in the following section.
26 Walstrom, Bilateral Air-Transport Agreements Concluded by the United States, 15 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 1126-29 (22 Dec. 1946).
27 Kittrie, United States Regulation of Foreign Airlines Competition, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 2
(1963).
28 Air Transport Agreement With France, 27 Mar. 1946, 61 Stat. 3445, T.I.A.S. No. 1679.
29 THOMAS, ECONoMic REGULATION OF SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT 213 (1951).
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Ireland stipulated that the United States could fly into Ireland, but only
if it made Shannon airport its first and last European port of call." It
is obvious that the establishment of bilateral agrements has allowed the
United States to avoid, in great part, the restrictionist policy which the
British advocated in Chicago in 1944. However, this country has been
able to avoid capacity and frequency restrictions only by (1) granting
reciprocal landing rights to most of the countries with which it has
negotiated bilaterals, and (2) by agreeing to allow the International Air
Transport Association to set rates on the international flights of carriers
belonging to that organization. Our discussion of the regulation to which
United States international air carriers are subjected, therefore, would not
be complete without giving attention to the mechanism by which rate
wars are avoided.
C. The International Air Transport Association
This section describes the operations of IATA and analyzes the power
of that organization to exercise control over United States international
carriers. In the great majority of cases, IATA determines the rates to be
charged on the international flights of American carriers; however, there
are rare instances when the establishment of rates cannot be effected by
IATA. Thus, this section will also discuss those cases where rates are
established according to the principles of the Bermuda Bilateral Agree-
ment.
1. Early History of IATA
As early as 1919, representatives of six European countries had estab-
lished an organization called the International Air Traffic Association.
The chief aim of this organization, which included airlines from England,
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, was "estab-
lishment of unity in the operation of air toures of affiliated organizations
whose systems are of international importance."'" Between 1919 and
1939, the "old" IATA undertook the task of providing guidelines for
the standardization of international air carriage among the Association
members. The organization conceived its chief initial functions to be (1)
the clarification of international aviation law, and (2) the standardiza-
tion of aviation technology. During the first two decades of its existence,
IATA provided an invaluable service to the future development of the
industry by its efforts to bring some semblance of order into these two
areas. However, at no time during this entire pre-World War II period
did the old IATA establish the price-fixing machinery which was to be
the most important feature of the organization after the war. The founders
of the earlier organization were more concerned with standardizing the
conditions of air travel than with avoiding competition.
The amazing expansion of the industry's operations during World War
8 Air Transport Agreement With Ireland, 3 Feb. 1945, 59 Stat. 1402, E.A.S. No. 460.
" INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, IATA-THE FIRST THREE DECADES I
(1949).
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II created a host of new postwar problems in international commercial
aviation, many of which were manifest in the discussion at the Chicago
Conference. The delegates to the Conference, it will be recalled, had left
that meeting without formulating a postwar policy to avoid "unhealthy
competition" on international routes. Therefore, it was imperative that
the world's international carriers effect some kind of agreement which
would make such competition impossible. As a response to this need, repre-
sentatives of forty-one airlines met in Havana in December 1945 and
created the International Air Transport Association, the main purpose of
which was to control rates on the international flights provided by its
members.
To insure that American participation in the organization would not
run afoul of domestic legislation, the IATA Bylaws included two im-
portant provisions, both of which were aimed at clearly distinguishing
that organization from the type of cartel which was thought to be in
conflict with United States antitrust laws. The first provision stipulated
that a rate could be established by IATA only when the tariff received
unanimous approval from members of the organization, thereby making
it impossible for any group of carriers to exercise absolute control over
the rate structure. The second provision stipulated that rate agreements
made by IATA would be subject to the approval of the aeronautical
authority of each country represented by an airline in IATA. This second
bylaw was really the significant one from the United States point of
view, since it made it possible for the CAB to control, although indirectly,
any rate agreement to which an American carrier became a party, thereby,
hopefully, providing an antitrust exemption. " For the purposes of estab-
lishing rates, IATA divided the world into nine separate areas. Airlines
operating in any of the nine areas would be allowed one vote on any
proposed rate for flights to and from that area. Once IATA had estab-
lished rates for flights in all nine areas, the CAB would be empowered to
pass upon such rates before they could be charged to the public. Because
the IATA Bylaws contained these two important provisions, by 1946
the organization had garnered support from both the CAB and the
American international carriers. The current operations of IATA have
been substantially broadened as additional carriers have joined the Asso-
ciation, and as the world international air transport industry has extended
its operations to every area of the world.
2. IATA in 1964
In the Articles of Association of IATA, "s the broad aims of the organi-
zation are articulated. According to these Articles, the aims and objects
of IATA are:
(1) To promote safe, regular and economical air transport for the benefit
of the peoples of the world, to foster air commerce, and to study the
problems connected therewith;
a" It will be recalled that Section 412(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 gave the Board
power to pass on all agreements entered into by any certified air carrier.
" IATA, Act of Incorporation, Articles of Association, Rules and Regulations (6th Pub. 1964).
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(2) To provide means for collaboration among the air transport enterprises
engaged directly or indirectly in international air transport services;
(3) To co-operate with the International Civil Aviation Organization and
other international organizations.
In addition to the establishment of rates on all flights involving IATA
members, IATA has other functions which are aimed at facilitating
international air transport. The IATA Financial Committee,"5 for instance,
is charged with operation of the IATA "clearing house." The clearing
house allows member airlines (and some non-members) to settle interline
accounts much in the same way as that in which commercial banks clear
their own accounts through the Federal Reserve System. Another example
of non-rate functions are those provided by the Executive Committee,
which is headed by a permanent Director. The Director acts as the final
arbiter of IATA policy disputes, he supervises the activities of regional
branches, and he is the main public spokesman for the Association.
Such non-price fixing functions of IATA, while extremely important
in facilitating the operations of the members, are only secondary functions
of the Association. No doubt, the provisions for standardization of flight
conditions, the dissemination of aviation technology, and the clarification
of international aviation law, are to the benefit of both the airlines and
their customers. By reducing inefficient trade practices, these IATA activi-
ties have, in substantial part, provided for the rapid development of inter-
national air transport into its present form. Nonetheless, this development
would have been much more chaotic had it not been for the remaining
function of IATA-the establishment of "healthy" non-competitive rates
on international flights.
Every year,"0 Traffic Conferences are held at which time rates for all
cargo and passenger flights by IATA members are established. Also, pur-
suant to the Articles of Association, each Traffic Conference:
may consider and act upon all traffic matters of concern to their members
in their respective areas; provided that . . . the Traffic Conferences shall
concern themselves with all international air traffic matters involving
passengers, cargo and mail in their respective areas, particularly the follow-
ing:
(1) Analysis of operating costs;
(2) Fares, rates and -charges for passengers and cargo;
24 Ibid. Apparently the assumption of the authors of the Articles is that the avoidance of com-
petition in international air transport is to the direct benefit of the air carriers' customers. It may
well be difficult to convince the American tourist who paid $484 to fly round trip from New York
to London in July 1964 that this rate is to his "benefit." It may also seem strange to the 95%
(!) of the world's population who did not experience an international flight in 1963 that main-
tenance of non-competitive rates on international flights is to their "benefit." Apparently "economi-
cal air transport" means one thing to the air carriers and another to the consuming public.
as There are four standing Committees of IATA which are not directly concerned with rate
control. These are: the Medical Committee, the Technical Committee, the Legal Committee, and
the Financial Committee.
"5 In recent years Traffic Conferences have been held each October to establish rates effective
the following April. For administrative purposes, the world has been divided into three broad areas,
and, for each area, there is an annual Traffic Conference. (The nine Traffic Conference Areas estab-
lished in 1945 were reduced to three areas in 1947.) Area No. 1 includes the Western Hemisphere,
Greenland, and Hawaii; Area No. 2 includes Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Iran; and Area
No. 3 includes Asia, Australasia, and the islands of the Pacific.
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(3) Schedules;
(4) Approval of Agencies and their administration ...
The matter of business of a Traffic Conference is divided into two broad
areas." First, the members agree to resolutions which facilitate interline
traffic. This action does not include determination of the number of
scheduled flights, for IATA has no power in this regard. However, inter-
line traffic is facilitated by allowing members to promulgate their schedules,
and thus make them compatible with the schedules of other airlines which
may provide extension to their own routes. Methods of standardizing way-
bills, baggage receipts, and tickets, and ways to improve airport services,
are discussed at the Traffic Conferences. The ease with which passengers
are able to make an extended flight which necessitates traveling on more
than one IATA airline is, next to the establishment of rates, the main
concern of the Traffic Conferences.
The second type of business at a Traffic Conference is (1) the estab-
lishment of rates on the 60,000 separate services provided by IATA
members, and (2) agreements about the types of services to be provided
on each class of flights. When a resolution is made to establish a tariff for
a particular service, a vote is taken of all carriers providing that service;
if the vote is unanimous in favor of the rate, it becomes binding on all
voting members. In the event that the vote is not unanimous, efforts are
made to reach agreement on a compromise tariff. On rare occasions, no
agreement can be reached for a service; and in such cases, an "open rate"
situation prevails in that area beginning the following 1 April. Of course,
the primary purpose of IATA is to avoid price competition; thus the
threat of open rates has induced the carriers to reach agreement on all
services in the overwhelming majority of Traffic Conferences."8
After the three Traffic Conferences succeed in establishing the 60,000
separate tariffs, the American carriers submit this schedule of rates to
the CAB for approval. In the event that the Board (or the equivalent
agency in any other foreign government) fails to approve a schedule of
rates set by the Traffic Conferences, IATA ordinarily will call supple-
mentary conferences in order to work out some new agreement which
will satisfy the dissident aeronautical authority.
The IATA rate agreements are policed by an Enforcement Section
under the direction of the Director General. The purpose of this En-
forcement Section is to maintain the closest possible adherence to rate
and service agreements during the period between Traffic Conferences.
Member carriers not adhering to IATA agreements are subject to fines
up to $25,000 per offense; and, in extreme cases, carriers can be sus-
pended from the organization. Because most members of IATA have
" For an excellent discussion of the procedure of an IATA Traffic Conference, see Cohen, A
Case History in International Air Fares and Rates Negotiation, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 150 (1960).
" Open rate situation have never degenerated into rate wars; apparently there is a tacit agree-
ment among the members of IATA simply to maintain the rates agreed to in the previous Traffic
Conference. In 1953, the CAB rejected the entire Pacific rate agreement. Nonetheless, throughout
1953, members charged the rates established in 1952. See Bebchick, The International Air Transport
Association and the Civil Aeronautics Board, 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 8, 25 (1958).
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joined the Association to avoid price competition, compliance with IATA
resolutions is the general rule. Most frequently, infractions involve a
failure to comply with agreements concerning the type of service to be
provided on flights, rather than failure to charge the correct rate." Al-
though the Enforcement Committee is in almost continuous session dealing
with alleged infractions, apparently "the great majority of IATA's mem-
bers follow the spirit as well as the letter of its rules and do their best to
train their staffs with these principles in view.""
From the point of view of IATA member airlines, the Association has
been very successful since its incorporation in 1945. Rate wars have been
almost nonexistent, and the non-price activities of IATA have greatly
reduced the complexities of international air transport. Moreover, less
than five per cent of IATA rate agreements have been disapproved by
governments; this fact is cited by IATA as evidence that, in the great
majority of cases, the rates agreed to have been in the best interest of the
consuming public." The prevailing opinion among member airlines is
that the IATA machinery affords a highly successful method of avoiding
rate wars, and is an excellent framework for coordinating the industry's
operations.
There are other writers, however, who do not agree that the activities
of IATA necessarily accrue to the public's benefit. In 1961, an article in
the Harvard Law Review argued that:
The real reasons for the carriers' support of the IATA is probably not the
danger of destructive rate wars but the advantage of being able to set high
rates, which protect the less efficient operators. ... "
In 1955, Joshua Lee, then a Member of the Board, argued vigorously
against giving permanent approval to IATA. Lee maintained that effective
competition depends upon the ability of competing firms to cut rates, and
that rate controls "always lead to setting the price at a level profitable to
the most inefficient operator." 3 Bebchick concurred with Lee, and argued
that the "excessively high" level of international rates in 1958 indicated
that Lee's prophecy about non-price competition had come true." As a
rejoinder to criticisms regarding the general level of rates, the member
airlines are quick to point out that the price of international air transport
has been progressively reduced since the 1945 period.5
a9In 1955, the IATA Atlantic Traffic Conference agreed to establish "economy-class" fares.
Passengers purchasing this class of ticket were given smaller seat spaces and were served sandwiches
rather than the more elaborate meals served the tourist and first-class passengers. Soon after, Pan
American complained to the IATA Enforcement Section that several European airlines were "piling
whole rich meals of pate, fish, and even fruit on a slice of bread and calling it a sandwich ....
This "sandwich affair" is a good example of failure on the part of members to comply with non-rate
IATA agreements. For a discussion of the sandwich crisis, see International Airlines: The Great Jet
Gamble, Fortune, June 1958, p. 228.
40 Enforcing Airline Agreements: How IATA's Control System Operates, Flight, 22 Jan. 1960,
p. 122.
41 INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, FACTS ABOUT IATA 13 (1964).
4 Comment, CAB Regulation of International Aviation, 75 HARv. L. REv. 575, 579 (1961).
' Lee is quoted in Bebchick, supra note 38, at 161.
44 Id. at 40.
4SFor example, in 1945, the cost of a one-way trip from London to New York was as much
as $575. Effective April 1964 a round trip flight from London to New York can be made for as
little as $300. The reduction in rates since 1945 has not been confined to the Atlantic area.
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Other writers have criticized IATA because its members do not provide
adequate information to governments concerning the relationship of
IATA rates to the costs incurred by the member airlines. Stephen Wheat-
croft stated:
Most governments have undertaken in their air transport agreements to
insure that the fares and rates approved are "fixed at reasonable levels, due
regard being paid to all relevant factors. .. ."
The Governments are obviously unable to form any reasonable opinion
about "economical operation" unless they have available adequate financial
and statistical data not only about their own airlines but also other airlines
operating in the same area."
Nonetheless, Wheatcroft did conclude that the Traffic Conferences "seem
reasonably well to protect the public interest in international air trans-
port. . ..
Notwithstanding these criticisms of IATA, the nineteen-year perpetua-
tion of the Association provides ample evidence that both the airlines and
the governments they represent accept IATA as necessary to the develop-
ment and orderly operations of the international air transport industry.
The CAB, though at times not fully in agreement with IATA rate policies,
has never wavered in its view that the Association provides a crucial serv-
ice to the American industry. Evidently, the Board, like most foreign
aeronautical authorities, approves the IATA machinery as the least prob-
lematic method of avoiding ruinous price wars among competing inter-
national carriers. As long as most international carriers fear domination
by the larger members of the industry, and a majority is opposed to con-
trol by an international government agency with economic regulatory
powers, the IATA will probably continue to carry out its present func-
tions.
3. Establishment of International Rates When IATA Fails
This section discusses the procedure through which international rates
are established in the event that no agreement can be reached in the IATA
Traffic Conferences. Specifically, we are concerned here with cases in
which IATA rate agreements are not approved by the CAB.
It will be recalled from earlier discussion that the CAB derives its
power to void IATA rate agreements from section 412 of the 1958
Federal Aviation Act." Though the Board had not chosen to exercise this
power for over a decade, in March 1963 it refused to approve IATA
rate resolutions made in the preceding October, and this refusal created
a mild crisis in the industry. In September and October of 1962, IATA
met at Chandler, Arizona, at its annual Traffic Conference, at which the
membership adopted fare increases on both transatlantic and transpacific
41 WHEATCROFT, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT 225 (1946).
4Id. at 224.
4872 Stat. 731 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1964).
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routes." On 10 December 1962, the CAB met with Pan American and
TWA, the two American carriers servicing the transatlantic route, and
ordered the two airlines to submit reports explaining why they favored
increased rates. On 18 March 1963, the CAB, having failed to receive ade-
quate justification from Pan American and TWA for increasing fares on
the North Atlantic route, issued an order disapproving initiation of the
proposed rate. With the exception of Canada, governments of the remain-
ing members of IATA had approved the proposed rate increase. The
Board's order, therefore, threatened to create an open rate situation for
the coming year.
The reasons for the Board's decision in the matter were complex and
reflected several changes in the character of the industry which had taken
place since 1945. For a long time prior to 1962, the Board, the Department
of State, and the two American carriers had advocated significant reduc-
tions in the transatlantic route structure."0 The Americans argued that
by lowering transatlantic air fares, the industry could go a long way in
solving the growing problem of overcapacity. Apparently, the profit-
motivated airlines believed that the additional passengers induced to fly
because of reduced fares, would produce increased profits. On the other
hand, it has been argued that most of the European airlines:
are in a very real sense government organizations, either being government
entities or business in form but heavily subsidized by government. Generally,
foreign airlines are as much an instrument of policy and governmental
prestige as a carrier of passengers and cargo. Certainly this is a legitimate
function of an international fleet. However, long-term subsidization com-
bined with continued awareness of prestige and policy are factors which con-
tribute to the generally accepted fact that foreign carriers are rarely as
economically efficient as are United States carriers. . . . In addition it is
generally thought that discounting and rebating are practiced heavily by some
foreign carriers. In these circumstances foreign airlines and their governments
have generally sought to solve the economic problem by raising tariffs in
attempts to make current operations pay or to cut losses on the basis of
present capacity and the prevailing volume of traffic."s
The European airlines opposed rate reductions because they were not con-
vinced, as were the American carriers, that, in the event of fare reduc-
tions, the market would be expanded and that their profits thus would be
increased.
" For a discussion of this entire issue, see the following: Comment, The Role of the United
States in the 1963 Transatlantic Air Fare Crisis, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 82 (1964); Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 20 May 1963, pp. 39-40; and, Hearings on International Air Transport Rates
before the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as 1963 Rate Hearings].
"°For a general discussion of this matter, see Comment, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 82, 84 (1964).
Specific statements concerning the rate policy of the Department of State and the two American
carriers can be found in 1963 Rate Hearings. Abram Chayes, legal advisor to the Department of
State, stated that the United States Government "has been and continues to be in favor of lower
transatlantic fares." Id. at 31. John Leslie of Pan American argues that his company has advocated
lower transatlantic fares consistently since 1945. Id. at 54. Thomas K. Taylor of TWA advocates
lower transatlantic fares and discusses the reason for his position. Id. at 86.
" Comment, The Role of the United States in the 1963 Transatlantic Air Fare Crisis, 30 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 82, 84 (1964). In 1962, the British Overseas Airways Corporation incurred a loss
of over £9 million. It is understandable why BOAC would be adverse to rate cuts at the Chandler
Conference in October 1962.
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In an attempt to avoid an open rate situation, officials of the United
States Government met with government officials from interested European
nations. However, this meeting failed to result in a solution to the problem.
Although the new rates went into effect on 29 April 1963 (the 1 April
deadline had been extended in order to provide time to negotiate some
settlement), Pan American and TWA continued to charge the lower fares
agreed to in October 1961. The action of these two airlines provoked
several European governments, notably the British, to announce that if
Pan American and TWA continued to charge the lower fares, the air-
craft of these two companies would be seized upon landing on European
soil.
On 14 May, upon the advice of the State Department, the CAB re-
versed its earlier position and advised Pan American and TWA to raise
their rates on flights to those countries threatening to impose severe eco-
nomic sanctions. The problem was finally resolved by a meeting of nineteen
members of IATA in Bermuda which agreed to a compromise rate that
went into effect on 16 July 1963.
Immediately afterwards, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee of the United States Senate began hearings aimed at determining
answers to several provoking questions: Why, the Committee wanted to
know, did the CAB not counter the British threats with a reciprocal
threat to seize British aircraft landing in the United States? Why, since
the United States provides the great majority of transatlantic passengers,
does the CAB lack the power to establish lower fares which it considers
to be in the public's interest?52
In general, the Committee's hearingss" revealed that the CAB lacked
legislative authority to deal adequately with cases in which it disapproved
of rates established by IATA. This inadequacy apparently was the re-
sult of (1) ambiguity in Section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 and (2) certain stipulations in Annex II of the 1946 Bermuda
Agreement. It will be recalled that by the terms of the Bermuda Agreement
the United States and Britain had agreed to accept the rate making
machinery of IATA for a trial period of one year. In the event, however,
that rates could not be agreed upon through this machinery, the Bermuda
Agreement included two separate clauses54 which specified the procedure
through which rate disputes could be solved. This procedure was as follows:
The first clause, included in Annex II, paragraph (e) of the Agreement,
would apply when (and if) the Board received legislative authority to
set exact rates on international flights. The second clause included in
Annex II, paragraph (f) (which is still in effect, since the CAB has not
received such authority), provides that in cases where IATA fails to
establish rates acceptable to either the United States Government or the
British Government, the two nations can seek to reach agreement at the
52 In 1962, 62.4% of all passengers flying the transatlantic route were United States citizens.
However, foreign airlines carried over 60% of the total number of transatlantic passengers during
the same year.
s 1963 Rate Hearings.
Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, para. (e) & (f).
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governmental level. If such an agreement is reached, each contracting party
is charged with inducing its carriers to charge the agreed upon rate. If,
however, no agreement can be reached at the governmental level, the
objecting party "may take such steps as it may consider necessary to pre-
vent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the
rate complained of."55 And so, when Pan American and TWA continued
to charge a rate unacceptable to the British, the British Government (in
this case, the objecting party) relied on this clause of the Bermuda Agree-
ment and threatened to take such steps as were necessary to "prevent the
inauguration or continuation" of the service.
At the same time, the CAB did not believe that it had legislative
authority to impose similar sanctions on foreign airlines. Section 402 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that the Board can attach to
a foreign air carrier permit "such reasonable terms, conditions, or limita-
tions as, in its judgment, the public interest may require." The Board,
according to Chairman Alan Boyd, however, did not interpret section 402
as giving the CAB power to impose economic sanctions similar to those
threatened by the British."
At the 1946 Bermuda Conference, the American delegation had believed
that as soon as the Agreement was signed, or shortly thereafter, Congress
would grant the Board power to set exact rates on international flights;
the two separate rate clauses of the Bermuda Agreement reflected this
mistaken belief. Paragraph (e), which becomes effective when the Board
is empowered to establish exact rates, provides that if one party objects
to a new rate, this rate could go into effect following consultations and
pending a third party report." A disputed rate could remain in effect in-
definitely, and, pending settlement, the American carriers could operate
at one rate level and British carriers at another, without either party hav-
ing power to take action against the carriers of the other party.
The advantage to the United States under the proposed paragraph (e)
is apparent. This country had long advocated lower fares on transatlantic
flights; thus, had paragraph (e) been in effect during 1962-1963, the
British carriers would have been forced, because of the lower fares being
charged by Pan American and TWA, to reduce their own rates on the
transatlantic route. Moreover, under paragraph (e), the British would
have had no legal power to threaten seizure of the aircraft of the United
States airlines.
The 1963 hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce con-
vinced a majority of senators of the need for legislation which would
make impossible the type of situation which followed the 1962 Chandler
Traffic Conference. Thus, Senate Bill 1540, introduced by Senator Warren
5 Bermuda Agreement, Annex II, para (f). (Emphasis added.)
56 Abram Chayes, legal advisor to the Department of State, agreed with Chairman Boyd that the
CAB lacked legislative authority to impose economic sanctions upon foreign carriers. See 1963 Rate
Hearings 32, 37-43.
" At this time (1945), ICAO had not been established. Annex II, para. (g), of the Bermuda
Agreement stipulated that the PICAO would act as a third party in the event of a rate dispute
between the United States and Britain.
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Magnuson on 28 August 1963, passed the Senate on 29 November 1963.
(Though S. 1540 received the support of the CAB, the Department of
State, and the late President Kennedy, action has not yet been taken on
the bill by the House of Representatives.) The bill would, among other
things, give the CAB power to set exact rates on flights of United States
and foreign carriers between the United States and foreign nations. Pur-
suant to the Bermuda Agreement, when such rate setting power is con-
ferred upon the Board, paragraph (e) of the Bermuda Agreement will
become effective.
Presumably, the Board currently hopes that IATA will establish rates
acceptable to a majority of Board members, for the 1962-1963 experience
has probably made the Board more hesitant than ever to void IATA rate
agreements. Of course, this situation could be ameliorated if a bill similar
to Senate Bill 1540 were to pass Congress. Until such time as comparable
legislation is passed, however, recourse to the bilateral agreements as a
means of establishing international rates appears to be a poor course of
action."
To this point, in addition to the price-fixing activities of IATA, the
roles of the CAB and the Executive Branch of the United States Govern-
ment in regulating this country's international carriers have been ex-
plained. In this and the past two sections, specific discussion of the inter-
national air transport policy of the United States Government as it is
formulated by the Board and by the Executive Branch has been inten-
tionally avoided. Although the Federal government's role in regulating
the industry is defined by domestic and international law, it should be
apparent that the letter of this body of law allows a considerable degree
of flexibility to the Board and the Executive Branch in determining com-
mercial aviation policy. This policy is analyzed below.
D. The United States International Air Transport Policy
1. The Formulation of Policy
The growing importance of international air transport during the past
decade was reflected on 24 June 1963, when the Department of State an-
nounced that Mr. Allen R. Ferguson had been appointed Coordinator for
International Aviation." This new office, some of whose duties had been
performed by the State Department Office of Transport and Communi-
cations:
"It has been argued that:
[A]doption of S. 1540 would be the biggest single immediate step that the United
States could take toward achieving practical results in its efforts to lower international
air tariffs. Giving the CAB the power to make rates would relieve foreign governments
of the power to impose sanctions and at the same time permit the United States to
charge low fares in contrast to foreign high fares until settlements were reached.
Comment, 30 J. AiR L. & COM. 82, 90 (1964).
It is worth mention that the Air Transport Association, the trade association for the United States
airline industry, vigorously opposed S. 1540, and offered an alternative bill. The opposition to
S. 1540 by ATA may partially explain the bill's unpopularity in the House of Representatives.
For a discussion of S. 1539 (an ATA sponsored alternative to S. 1540), and the arguments sup-
porting the bill, see 1963 Rate Hearings 134-44.
" Dep't of State Press Release No. 332, 24 June 1963. This document was kindly forwarded
to the writer by Henry T. Snowden, Chief of the State Department's Aviation Negotiations Division.
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is charged with the responsibility for formulating international aviation
policy. . . . The Office will be responsible for inter-agency coordination of
international commercial aviation policy, working with the Department of
Defense and Commerce, and the Agency for International Development as
well as with the Federal Aviation Agency and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
International air transport policies will be implemented largely through a
continuation of the system of bilateral agreements for the exchange of air
routes and air traffic rights."0
To perform his task, the International Aviation Coordinator is assisted
by a Policy Staff, an Aviation Negotiations Division, and a Liaison Divi-
sion which has primary responsibility for coordination of international
air transport activities with the other interested government agencies.
The Coordinator and his Policy Staff are charged with carrying out State
Department negotiations with foreign governments, and thus have the
responsibility, together with the CAB, of defining the character of re-
ciprocal rights to be granted to foreign governments which allow United
States carriers to service their country.
The Coordinator for International Aviation, after having consulted
with the Board (and other concerned government agencies), recommends
policy to the Secretary of State. His office is a part of the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Economic Affairs. Although the Secretary of State re-
tains leadership in the field of international civil aviation, presumably
policy recommendations made to the Secretary will now be based upon
more intensive and specialized departmental research than formerly. At
the same time, clearance of political desk officers is surely still required,
and, of course, any policy recommended by the Secretary of State is
presumably also cleared with other interested agencies and eventually
subject to Presidential approval.
A recent reorganization of the Staff of the Civil Aeronautics Board also
reflects the growing importance of international air transport. On 3 Sep-
tember 1964, Chairman Alan S. Boyd announced6' that the CAB's Bureau
of International Affairs would be reorganized. This reorganization, ac-
cording to Boyd, reflected:
the ever growing importance of the CAB's role in the international civil
aviation community and in the implementation of the United States Inter-
national Air Transport policy.
In addition, Boyd noted that the:
purpose of the reorganization is to streamline and strengthen the Bureau [of
International Affairs] by realigning its functions to encompass two broad
areas: a Negotiations Division and a Policy and Programs Division.
The Policy and Programs Division will:
perform special studies in problem areas and will represent the CAB in inter-
agency and international aviation policy planning groups.
60 Ibid.
6' CAB Press Release 64-96, 3 Sept. 1964.
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The Negotiations Division will have:
worldwide responsibility for handling of international civil aviation relations
for the CAB and will represent it in bilateral negotiations with foreign gov-
ernments. Previously these functions were handled by two separate divisions
on a geographic basis.
Chairman Boyd stated that this division of labor in the Bureau of
International Affairs will "streamline and strengthen" the method by
which policy is formulated by the Board's Staff. In addition to providing
greater emphasis on long-range planning in international civil aviation,
the "reorganization will make for better utilization and productivity of
staff through more direct placement of responsibility and improved pro-
cedures."
Thus, whatever the international air transport policy of the United
States Government may be, it is initially formulated by specialized staffs
in the Department of State and in the CAB and presumably cleared with
other interested agencies. The Board promulgates international air trans-
port policy primarily through the decisions it renders in rate cases and
in route cases involving international carriers. The Secretary of State,
acting as an agent of the President, promulgates the air transport policy
of the Executive Branch through its consultation with and advice to the
CAB on international air transport matters, and by the character of its
bilateral negotiations with foreign governments. The essential features of
present policy are outlined below.
2. The Present Policy
One particularly vexing problem of the international air transport in-
dustry which has arisen since 1940 has been caused by the increasingly
intensive competition on the transatlantic route. The growing number of
foreign carriers on this route has led to a steadily decreasing share of the
transatlantic market held by American carriers. In the year ending 30
June 1962, United States carriers on the transatlantic route (Pan American
and TWA) carried only 38.4% of the 2,274,697 persons flying between
the United States and Europe. The share of the transatlantic market held
by the two carriers has fallen during the past decade, despite the fact that
during this same period, over 60o of all transatlantic passengers were
American citizens. In 1961, the growing share of the market being taken
by foreign carriers prompted President Kennedy to appoint a Steering
Committee to study the entire area of international air transport. The
Committee included members of several government agencies to which
international air transport is a major area of concern,"2 and was assisted
in its investigation by two private research firms, several United States
international carriers, the Air Transport Association, and by other organi-
zations concerned with the international air transport industry. The dual
2The members of the Committee were N. E. Halaby, Federal Aviation Agency, Chairman;
K. R. Hansen, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Secretary; Alan S. Boyd, Chairman, Civil Aero-
nautics Board; H. B. Chenery, Agency for International Development; Griffith Johnson, Depart-
ment of State; C. Daniel Martin, Department of Commerce; and Frank K. Sloan, Department of
Defense.
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purpose of the Committee's investigation were (1) to determine the
causes of the diminishing share of the transatlantic market serviced by
United States carriers and (2) to determine the effect of this diminution
on the United States balance of payments.
In April 1963, after two years of research, the President's Steering
Committee submitted a statement on international air transport policy."
Apparently, the main purpose of the Policy Statement was to relate the
balance of payments problems to the international air transport policy
of the United States Government. 4
After approving the Committee's report, President Kennedy "directed
the officials of this government concerned with air transport to be guided
by this policy statement in carrying out their statutory responsibilities."65
The air transport policy recommended in the report received the support
of the Department of State and the CAB (leading officials from these two
agencies had played a dominant role in writing the Policy Statement) and,
pursuant to the directive from President Kennedy, the two agencies have
undertaken to implement the dictates of the Policy Statement. The Policy
Statement is a fifteen page document setting forth the goals which the
United States Government intends to pursue in international air transport.
For the purpose of analysis, the Policy Statement has been subdivided into
three general areas which are relevant to this study. Each area is discussed
below.
3. Broad Aims in International Air Transport
The Policy Statement reveals the Committee's belief that non-economic
considerations are a very important element of this country's international
air transport policy:
[The international air transport policy of this country] must promote the
welfare of U.S. air carriers, an important element in our commercial life and
a beneficial influence in the world's air transport system. It must be appropri-
ately mindful of the U.S. strategic and political interests. Above all, it must
develop for the passenger and the shipper of goods a sound, efficient system of
air transport."
The extent to which these non-economic factors determine United States
6 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Statement on United States International Air
Transport Policy, 24 April 1963 [hereinafter referred to as Policy Statement]. The Policy State-
ment is also printed in 30 J. AiR L. & CoM. 76 (1964). References here are made to the White
House Press Release.
4 Neither President Kennedy nor the Committee stated that the main purpose of the investiga-
tion was "to solve the problem of the adverse balance of payments in the international air transport
account." President Kennedy asked the Committee to determine "whether U.S. air policies de-
veloped since 1944 can adequately serve U.S. interests in the future." Nonetheless, the discussion
of the balance of payments problem covers almost half of the Committee's Policy Statement, and
the discussion of other problem areas in international air transport is either superficially brief or
avoided completely.
65To the knowledge of this writer, President Johnson has not indicated whether the 1963
Policy Statement is consistent with his own views on international air transport. Nevertheless, this
writer assumes that President Johnson approves the Committee's recommended international air
transport policy, mainly because of his frequently reiterated concern about the adverse balance of
payments.
66 Policy Statement 1.
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air transport policy, is, of course, an important matter for consideration
in the recommendations made below in Part V.67
4. Problems of the Industry
With reference to the adverse affect on the balance of payments of
the number of transatlantic passengers carried by foreign airlines, the
Committee suggested that:
The reduction of this country's unfavorable balance of payments is a matter
of great national importance, and consequently the impact of air transport
on this balance has been and must continue to be considered with exceptional
care. At present air transport contributes to this deficit. Assuming any kind
of realistic division of market between U.S. and foreign carriers, so long
as U.S. residents predominate among air travellers, it will be impossible to
eliminate the present unfavorable balance in the air transport account of the
balance of payments."
Although the Committee conceded that within the framework of the exist-
ing system of bilateral agreements "the effect of various air transport
policies on our balance of payments is limited," the "policies in this re-
port . . .will help in this regard." Having hinted at the source of its
major concern in international air transport, the Committee then de-
scribed a "basic framework" within which United States international
carriers should operate. It was hoped that implementation of a policy
within this framework would help solve, or at least substantially reduce,
the vexing problem of the gold drain. Although the Committee was
apparently not concerned with the problem of extensive unutilized ca-
pacity in the industry, the Policy Statement underwrites an international
air transport policy which has a direct bearing on the problem of over-
capacity.
5. The Basic Framework for the United States International Air Policy
a. Bilateral Agreements-The fundamental conservatism of the Policy
Statement is manifest in the discussion of bilateral agreements:
The U.S. will maintain the present framework of bilateral agreements
by which air routes are exchanged among nations and the rights to carry
traffic on them are determined according to certain broad principles. The sub-
stitution of a multilateral agreement seems even less feasible or acceptable
today than when first attempted at the Chicago Conference of 1944.69
According to the Committee, the restrictive policies of the British at
Chicago "would result in endless bickering among nations as to their
proper share of traffic." On the other hand, the United States position at
Chicago of "unregulated freedom" was "completely impractical." In
67 The following is a hypothetical example of how a non-economic factor could shape aviation
policy (a factor, in this case, which might compound the problem of overcapacity): Assume that
Country A, which can offer the United States no profitable air routes, but which from a military
view is strategically located, should desire to fly the New York to London route. While the CAB
and the Department of State may desire to refuse certification of Country A carriers to fly the
route for purely economic reasons, insistence by the Executive to certify the carriers for military
reasons could lead to an "uneconomical" certification of a foreign carrier.
6 Policy Statement 4-5.
69 Id. at 7.
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addition, the bilateral agreement method of exchanging routes was en-
dorsed in the Policy Statement as a useful tool in providing economic
growth of air transportation. Thus, any radical departure from the use
of bilateral agreements for the determination of international routes would
probably be denied support from the United States Government.
b. Extension of Existing Routes-According to the Policy Statement,
the "present network of international air routes is . . .rather fully de-
veloped. Consequently, an expansion of the present route structures must
be approached with caution.""0 In areas where there are already several
carriers providing services (such as on the transatlantic route), "our over-
all policy must not accentuate a situation which, on its face, cannot be
sound."
c. Capacity Principles-The policy to be followed in this area is clear:
The United States supports the "Bermuda" capacity principles which flexi-
bly govern the amount of service individual carriers may offer to the world
travelling and shipping public....
We believe that the "Bermuda" principles accommodate, to the general
good, the legitimate economic interests of all nations engaged in international
air transport. Our policy, then, will be to oppose both arbitrary capacity re-
strictions and the stretching of those principles to the point of abuse.71
d. Rates-According to the Committee, the multilateral mechanism of
IATA, "though it has some drawbacks, seems to be the most practical one
we can achieve, and it should be maintained.""2 However, the Policy
Statement continues, in order to:
provide for more effective governmental influence on rates, Congress should
adopt legislation which would give to the Civil Aeronautics Board authority,
subject to approval by the President, to control rates in international air trans-
port to and from the United States.7
Thus, the International Air Transport Association was given renewed
support by the United States Government. The fact of this support means
that it is unlikely that attempts will be made to solve the problem of
overcapacity in the industry by a policy of substantial rate reductions.
As was pointed out earlier, foreign carriers are allowed to maintain the
high level of international rates (which, of course, are an important
cause of low load factors) through the machinery of the IATA, only
because they can veto any resolution for lower rates made by United
States carriers.
e. Competition among United States Carriers-Since 1940, the Board
has followed a policy of maintaining competition between United States
carriers on international routes. The Committee underwrote this policy
and described it as "sound," and "deserving" to be reaffirmed. The reasons
for the Committee's support of the policy of regulated competition on
international routes were explicit:
70 Ibid.
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Government flexibility in implementing international political and aviation
policies would be reduced if the interests of any single carrier became, over
the long run, too dominant a factor in United States aviation policy. At
present no one appears to be advancing the concept of a monopoly carrier to
perform all United States international air services ...
The multi-carrier policy . . . was developed . . . when the United States
was by far the world's pre-eminent air power. . . . This condition no longer
obtains in most areas. Nonetheless, achievement of the traditional policy of
more than one strong United States carrier, and maintaining a competitive
structure which strikes a balance between monopoly operation and excessive
competition, is sound, possible and necessary."
Adherence to the policy of regulated competition, however, was qualified:
[The concept of competition] cannot be used alone to decide a particular
regulatory question, and the potential impact of mergers was not considered
by the Committee. The service pattern most in the public interest must con-
tinue to be considered and determined on a case-by-case basis."5
A recent decision by a CAB hearing examiner indicates that the Board
will perpetuate the policy of maintaining regulated competition on inter-
national routes. On 9 July 1964, Examiner James Keith issued a 157 page
decision in which he rejected a plan to redraw the transatlantic routes
flown by Pan American and TWA. In 1963, the Staff of the CAB had
issued a report recommending a termination of competition between TWA
and Pan American in Western Europe. The proposed route system would
have divided Europe into "two spheres of operations," with Pan American
serving the Northern, Central, and Eastern European area; and TWA
serving Southern Europe and the Mediterranean area. Examiner Keith
said that the recent experience of both TWA and Pan American in the
transatlantic market has been so financially and operationally successful
that the new route system was unnecessary. From all indications, the Board
will approve these recommendations without substantial changes." Al-
though the CAB may be determining policy in this area on a "case-by-
case" basis, this decision, involving the most important international
route in the world, hints that abandonment of "regulated competition"
is unlikely.
6. Summary
The preceding analysis clearly indicates that the most recent state-
ment of this country's international air transport policy is, to all intents
and purposes, a tacit advocacy of maintaining the status quo in the inter-
national air transport industry. The broad principles governing the activi-
ties of international carriers laid down during the immediate post war
period have not been abandoned.
In 1940, the CAB, by certifying American Export Airlines to compete
with Pan American on the transatlantic route, established a policy of
regulated competition on all international routes where such competition
7 Id. at 11-12.
71 Id. at 13.
"
6Transatlantic Route Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 13577 (6 Feb. 1959) (examiner's
opinion).
1966]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
was justified by sufficient traffic. In 1945, this country adopted the bi-
lateral agreement as the chief instrument for establishing international
routes. In the following year, the CAB lent its support to the International
Air Transport Association, giving that organization the power to estab-
lish rates on the great majority of all international commercial flights.
Thus, by 1946, the United States Government had developed an inter-
national air transport policy which, in all of its important features, has
remained unchanged to the present time.
President Kennedy's Steering Committee acknowledged that the air
transport industry has been characterized by drastic changes over the
past twenty years. Moreover, the Committee admitted that:
Our present policies on international civil aviation were formed in the mid-
1940s, when the industry was at the beginning of what we believe will prove
to have been only its first great period of expansion. At all times during that
period U.S. carriers have played a significant role in the system. The years,
however, have witnessed many changes; a technological revolution climaxed
and dramatized by the introduction of jet airliners; the entry of competitive
carriers representing countries devastated by war; the emergence of nations
determined to participate in international air transport; and an increasing
capacity which outran the substantial increase in traffic. All these have pro-
foundly altered the circumstances of international air transport, without a
corresponding change in the policy framework within which it operates.77
The Committee, as this statement indicates, was obviously aware that
existing international air transport policy may be inadequate to deal with
present problems in the industry. It is surprising, therefore, that the "new"
policy recommended in the Policy Statement is actually a restatement of
an international air transport policy formulated almost two decades ago.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Statement, entry into the United States
international air transport industry remains under the control of the
CAB; rates on most international flights are still established by the IATA;
and international routes are still established according to the principles of
bilateral agreements. The Committee's support of these three principles
(and the support given to the Policy Statement by the Executive Branch
and by the CAB) indicate that any new problems in the industry must
be solved in a regulatory framework developed at a time when the inter-
national air transport system was embryonic and totally unlike the in-
dustry of today.
In addition to its reaffirmation of an admittedly obsolete international
air transport policy, the Committee did not even consider, as a problem
worth consideration, the extensive unutilized capacity generated by Ameri-
can international carriers. Apparently, the experts who concurred in writ-
ing the Policy Statement (and the government agencies which approved
it) failed to recognize the degree to which overcapacity exists in the in-
dustry; it is inconceivable that such a group could have been unaware of
the problem after two years of studying the industry's operations.
Since 1959, the passenger load factor for the combined operations of
77 Policy Statement 2.
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United States international air passenger/cargo carriers has fallen steadily.
Moreover, as the volume of seat miles offered by the industry has been
rapidly increasing, the amount of overcapacity flown has risen more sub-
stantially than the falling load factors indicated. This growth in over-
capacity generated by the United States international air transport in-
dustry raises two important questions: (1) What are the characteristics of
unutilized capacity in the industry? and (2) What are the causes of its
recent growth? Parts III and IV undertake to answer these two ques-
tions.
III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNUTILIZED CAPACITY
The purpose here is to outline the chief characteristics of unutilized
capacity generated by the United States international air transport in-
dustry between 1954-1963. Study of this ten year period has been under-
taken for the following reasons: (1) unlike data for one year, figures for
a ten year period allow an analysis of the growth of unutilized capacity,
and also provide a description of the dramatic increase in overcapacity
which has taken place since 1959, and (2) the magnitude of the unutilized
capacity in the industry can be analyzed more meaningfully in terms of
data for a decade. For purposes of clarity, the analysis below is separated
into three sections. The initial section describes overcapacity occurring
between 1954-1963 in the operations of the individual carriers. Additional
background information concerning the development of each carrier's
route system is also included, since Part IV assumes some knowledge of
this development. The second section combines several of the carriers into
groups which service specific geographic areas. By so combining the car-
riers' operations, it is possible to analyze the relation between unutilized
capacity and the different market areas served by the industry. The last
section summarizes and interprets the data presented in the preceding two
sections.
A. Capacity Utilization Of The Individual Carriers
Before presenting data for the individual carriers, it will be useful to
describe unutilized capacity as it occurred in the combined operations of
all nine members of the industry between 1954-1963. Table 2 outlines
these traffic data. The most important features of Table 2 are the follow-
ing ten year figures: (1) total available seat miles (total passenger
capacity) of 111,261.3 million; (2) total unutilized seat miles (total
overcapacity) of 46,482 million; and (3) an average passenger load
factor of 58.2 %.'" These figures provide convenient basic data to which
the operations of the individual carriers may be compared.
" The following data for 1964 indicate clearly that no significant change has occurred in the
industry's ability to utilize available seat miles more completely:
Total available seat miles ------------------------ 22.8 billion
Total revenue passenger miles ---------------------- 12.6 billion
Total unutilized seat miles -------------- ........------------------------ 10.2 billion
Passenger load factor -- - 5.4%
Even though the load factor in 1964 showed a slight increase, the number of unutilized seat miles
flown during the year was the highest in the history of the industry. Thus, the trend of flying a
continually growing volume of overcapacity continues. (The data are compiled from CAB, Am
CARRIER TRAvFic STATISTICS (Dec. 1964)).
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TABLE 2
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
CAPACITY UTILIZATION
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 5,890.4 3,481.0 2,409. 59.1%
1955 6,565.4 4,105.0 2,460. 62.5
1956 7,569.6 4,786.2 2,784. 63.2
1957 8,493.1 5,416.8 3,077. 63.8
1958 9,754.5 5,546.4 3,829. 59.2
1959 9,374.5 6,339.4 3,415. 65.0
1960 12,060.0 7,469.8 4,590. 61.9
1961 14,350.4 6,836.6 6,513. 54.6
1962 16,931.9 9,126.4 7,806. 53.9
1963 20,271.5 10,672.6 9,599. 52.6
Total 111,261.3 64,780.3 46,482. 58.2%'
* Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from Tables 3-14 below.
1. American Airlines
American's international operations are confined to service between the
United States and two foreign cities, Mexico City and Toronto. Prior to
1957, American's sole international route was to Mexico City; the Toronto
route was added that year. Table 3 describes unutilized capacity generated
by American during the 1954-1963 decade on its international routes.
During this period, American experienced a passenger load factor of
59.6%, and the company's operations resulted in over 712 million un-
utilized seat miles. During the decade, American provided 1.5 % of the
total available seat miles provided by the entire international industry,
and flew approximately 1.5 % of the industry's total revenue passenger
miles.
2. Braniff Airways
Braniff was established as an international carrier in 1946, at which
time Pan American's monopoly of the Latin American market was termi-
nated. In a 1946 decision, the Board granted certificates to seven United
States carriers, including Braniff, to service the Latin American area."
In this 1946 decision, a majority of the Board asserted that the traffic
potential in South America did not merit an additional carrier to com-
pete with Panagra and Pan American. Nevertheless, President Truman
overruled the Board's decision and, pursuant to the President's power to
certify international carriers, ordered the Board to grant Braniff a South
American route system. The route granted to Braniff was directly com-
" Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Latin Ameri-
can case].
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TABLE 3
AMERICAN AIRLINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*:
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 131.5 76.4 55.1 58.1%
1955 131.8 91.9 39.9 69.7
1956 149.3 99.0 50.3 66.3
1957 162.0 100.3 61.7 61.9
1958 218.4 115.3 103.1 52.8
1959 188.2 117.7 70.5 62.5
1960 192.7 114.2 78.5 59.2
1961 174.8 92.6 82.2 53.0
1962 206.7 121.2 85.5 58.6
1963 207.5 121.8 85.7 58.7
Total 1,762.9 1,050.0 712.5 59.6%1*
* Scheduled services. *" Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 196 (1963), and CAB [DEc. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 3 3.
TABLE 4
BRANIFF AIRWAYS UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 161.5 80.4 91.1 46.9%
1955 179.0 75.3 103.7 42.1
1956 144.6 69.4 75.2 48.0
1957 175.1 92.5 82.7 52.8
1958 181.8 88.8 93.0 48.8
1959 177.9 91.1 86.8 51.2
1960 241.9 128.4 113.5 53.1
1961 287.3 142.1 145.2 49.5
1962 295.2 137.7 157.5 46.6
1963 327.1 147.2 179.9 45.0
Total 2,181.4 1,052.8 1,128.6 48.3%**
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 197 (1963), and CAB [DEc. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 34.
petitive in some cities with Panagra on the west coast of South America,
and competitive with Pan American on the east coast.
The 1946 Latin American case, particularly after the intervention of
President Truman, represented a reiteration of the policy established in the
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1940 American Export case8" when the Board certified American Export
Lines to compete with Pan American on the transatlantic route, thus
establishing the policy of "regulated competition" between United States
carriers on international routes.
Table 4 shows that during the 1954-1963 decade, Braniff experienced
a passenger load factor of 48.3%, the lowest load factor of any of the
nine carriers in the industry. During the same decade, Braniff provided
approximately 2.2 billion, or 2% of the total available seat miles offered
by the industry. Of the 46.5 billion unutilized seat miles flown by the
industry during the ten year period, Braniff's 1.1 billion seat miles repre-
sented 2.4% of the total.
3. Delta Air Lines
As in the case of Braniff, Delta's international operations are confined
to the Latin American area. Table 5 shows that during the 1954-1963
period, Delta generated .54 billion unutilized seat miles, or about 1.2%
of the industry's total. The table also shows that Delta's ten year passenger
load factor was 49.4%, well below the ten year industry load factor of
58.2%.
TABLE 5
DELTA AIR LINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 119.0 49.3 69.7 41.5%
1955 112.6 55.6 57.0 49.4
1956 108.4 64.8 44.6 59.8
1957 131.2 81.7 49.5 62.3
1958 130.9 67.9 63.0 51.9
1959 123.9 60.0 63.9 48.5
1960 90.7 38.3 52.4 42.2
1961 58.1 21.2 36.9 43.3
1962 85.4 37.0 48.4 48.9
1963 112.2 54.8 57.4 48.9
Total 1,072.4 530.6 542.8 49.4T**
t Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 201 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 35.
4. Eastern Air Lines
Unlike most of the other international carriers, Eastern's international
services are not limited to a specific geographic area, but include flights
to Northeast Canada, to Mexico City, and to the Caribbean area. Eastern's
" American Export Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 2 C.A.B.
16 (1940), rei/d sub nor., Pan Am. Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941), on re-
mand, American Export Airlines, Inc.-American Export Lines-Control-American Export Air-
lines, 3 C.A.B. 619 (1942).
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first international routes were awarded in connection with the 1946
Latin American case that certified Braniff to operate a South American
route. The Board awarded Eastern a certificate to provide flights between
New Orleans and Mexico City, and, in addition, the carrier was certified
to operate from the United States to San Juan, Puerto Rico. In 1957,
Eastern added the Canadian cities to its route system, and, in the same
year it began servicing the East Coast-Bermuda market.
Table 6 shows that since 1954, Eastern has almost quintupled its annual
capacity provided on international routes. Though the company's inter-
national services were relatively insignificant in 1954, by 1963 Eastern
provided almost 10% of the total seat miles flown by the industry dur-
ing that year. During the entire ten year period, Eastern provided about
7.7% of the total capacity offered by the industry, and these operations
resulted in 3.4 billion unutilized seat miles.
TABLE 6
EASTERN AIR LINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 387.7 201.0 186.7 51.8%
1955 381.9 240.8 141.1 63.0
1956 509.3 324.6 183.7 63.9
1957 646.7 424.2 222.5 65.6
1958 836.3 466.7 369.6 55.8
1959 952.8 593.7 359.5 62.3
1960 1,079.7 718.7 361.0 66.6
1961 1,159.1 750.1 409.0 64.7
1962 1,070.2 606.5 463.7 56.7
1963 1,621.2 874.6 746.6 54.0
Total 8,644.9 5,201.5 3,443.4 60.27,-*
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 202 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 35.
5. Northwest Airlines
Throughout the entire pre-World War II period, Pan American was
the only American carrier certified to service the transpacific route. How-
ever, in a 1946 decision,"1 the Board ended Pan American's monopoly in
the area by certifying Northwest Airlines to fly a route from Chicago
and New York, via Canada and Alaska, to the Orient. Two years later,
in 1948, Northwest was awarded a certificate to operate a route to Hawaii
from Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland." Table 7 shows that during the 1954-
1963 period, Northwest provided approximately 5.5% of the total pas-
S"Northwest Airlines, Inc., Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).
81Pacific Northwest-Hawaii Service Case, 9 C.A.B. 414 (1948).
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senger capacity offered by the industry. Because Northwest's passenger
load factor of 51.3% is lower than the ten year industry average, the
carrier generated almost 6.5 % of the industry's total unutilized seat miles.
TABLE 7
NORTHWEST AIRLINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 311.0 161.1 149.9 51.8%
1955 367.4 194.0 173.4 52.8
1956 383.9 222.5 161.4 58.6
1957 470.3 259.8 210.5 55.2
1958 560.9 297.9 263.0 53.1
1959 658.4 353.9 364.5 53.8
1960 644.0 317.3 326.7 49.3
1961 706.4 341.5 364.9 48.4
1962 939.2 463.2 476.0 49.3
1963 1,123.3 553.4 569.9 49.3
Total 6,164.8 3,164.6 3,002.0 51.3%**
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 206 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 37.
6. Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra)
Panagra was formed in 1929 and is jointly owned by W. R. Grace
and Company, and Pan American Airways. By purchasing 50% owner-
ship of Panagra, Pan American was able to provide one-company service
from the northeast United States traffic pool to the populous west coast
of South America. Table 8 reveals a relatively slow growth rate in
Panagra's traffic data, the main reasons for which have been that (1)
during the decade, Panagra's route system has remained unchanged, and
(2) since 1946, Panagra has been subjected to intense competition from
Braniff on essentially the same South American route. Panagra provided
2.9% of the total seat miles flown by the industry between 1954-1963.
7. Pan American World Airways
Pan American is by far the largest "producer" in the industry. The
development of Pan American's route system was initiated in 1925 and the
system is presently the most complex and far reaching of any American
carrier. Unlike the operations of the other United States international
carriers, Pan American's combined services cannot be analyzed fruitfully
as a unified, single operation. For purposes of clarity, it is necessary to
discuss the carrier's services in terms of operations in the following four
markets: Alaska, the Atlantic and Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific.
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TABLE 8
PANAGRA AIRWAYS UNUTILIZED CAPACITY"
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 254.5 149.1 105.4 58.6%
1955 271.8 160.7 111.1 59.1
1956 283.7 168.7 115.0 59.4
1957 292.9 168.6 124.3 57.6
1958 301.4 160.1 141.3 53.1
1959 307.9 186.2 121.7 60.5
1960 345.0 198.1 146.9 57.4
1961 369.2 229.0 140.2 62.0
1962 369.7 236.7 133.0 64.0
1963 386.1 237.8 148.3 61.6
Total 3,182.2 1,895.0 1,287.2 57.57*"
Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 208 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 38.
TABLE 9
PAN AMERICAN: ALASKAN OPERATIONS UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 145.4 73.6 71.8 50.7%
1955 137.3 73.2 64.1 53.3
1956 129.5 77.5 52.0 59.9
1957 128.2 74.4 53.8 58.0
1958 87.2 46.9 40.3 53.9
1959 104.8 52.1 52.7 49.7
1960 132.4 68.4 64.0 51.7
1961 147.9 64.6 83.3 43.7
1962 224.4 63.2 161.2 28.2
1963 247.4 65.1 182.3 26.3
Total 1,484.5 659.0 825.5 44.4 To
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 210 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 39.
Pan American's Alaskan route was initiated in 1932 when the carrier
purchased two small Alaskan airlines. The dual purpose of this purchase
was to provide a base of operations for eventual flights to the Soviet
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Union and to train Pan American pilots in Arctic flying. Although the
Russian route has not been developed, Pan American continues to service
three Alaskan cities. However, as Table 9 demonstrates, the scale of the
Alaskan operations has never become a significant part of the carrier's
total operations. Between 1954-1963, Pan American's Alaskan operations
absorbed approximately 2% of the carrier's total capacity, and 1.3% of
the industry's total capacity. The passenger load factor for the decade,
an industry low of 44.4%, reflects the intense competition on the Alaskan
route resulting from the operations of Alaska Airlines and Pacific North-
ern Airlines.
Pan American's Latin American operations were initiated in 1927
when the company was awarded a United States Government contract to
fly mail between Key West and Havana. The carrier greatly increased its
Latin American operations during the 1930s, and by 1940 had developed
a complex route system serving most of the populous regions of the
entire area. Together with Panagra, Pan American was able to dominate
the Latin American market until the 1946 Board decision (and the inter-
vention of President Truman) ended the company's monopoly. None-
theless, Table 10 demonstrates that the Latin American market has pro-
vided Pan American with one of its healthiest passenger load factors for
the 1954-1963 period. The importance of Pan American's Latin American
operations is emphasized by the fac: that, during the 1954-1963 period,
these operations provided almost 20%1o of the total capacity offered by the
industry, and 34% of the total capacity offered by Pan American. 3
Pan American's transatlantic services are defined here to include the
company's operations in West Europe, Southern Europe, and the Near
East. The origin of Pan American's transatlantic route goes back to 1939.
During that year, the United States Government negotiated bilateral
agreements with Britain and France which allowed Pan American to fly
from New York to London and Marseilles. The company's South Atlantic
route was first certified in 1941, and its present South Atlantic route
system was awarded in 1946.4 The carrier's Mid-Atlantic route, extending
from San Juan to the Azores, Lisbon, and Madrid, was certified in 1957.8s
The combined operations of Pan American and TWA have resulted
in a decreasing share of the total transatlantic traffic.8" During the 1954-
83 It is important to note that despite the relatively high passenger load factors in its Latin
American operations, Pan American has frequently incurred losses in these operations in the recent
past. These losses were incurred although Pan American's per mile passenger fares were moderately
lower in this area than in other areas. This situation provides a good example of the frequent dis-
parity between profits and passenger load factors. In the case of its Latin American operations, Pan
American would obviously be more concerned with increasing load factors than in areas, such as
the transatlantic market, where profits are relatively high, and load factors are relatively low. See
Agreements Adopted by the International Air Transport Association, CAB Docket No. 13777 (12
Feb. 1963).
84 American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Arlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285 (1946).
" San Juan-Madrid Service Case, 25 C.A.B. 407 (1957).
s8 In 1954, the combined operations of Pan American and TWA comprised 52.5% of the trans-
atlantic passengers; by 1963, this share of the total market had fallen to 41.8%. This issue is dis-
cussed more extensively in Part III infra.
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TABLE 10
PAN AMERICAN: LATIN AMERICAN OPERATIONS
1954-1963
UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 1,369.4 822.0 547.0 60.0%
1955 1,493.7 944.7 549.0 63.2
1956 1,721.5 1,091.7 629.8 63.4
1957 1,916.8 1,242.9 673.9 64.8
1958 1,921.2 1,220.0 701.2 63.5
1959 2,139.9 1,443.7 696.2 67.5
1960 2,109.5 1,377.0 732.5 65.3
1961 2,504.0 1,582.7 921.3 63.2
1962 3,094.3 1,941.0 1,153.3 62.7
1963 3,410.0 2,023.2 1,386.8 59.3
Total 21,680.0 13,688.9 7,991.1 63.1%**
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 212 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 40.
TABLE 11
PAN AMERICAN: TRANSATLANTIC OPERATIONS UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 1,293.6 778.9 514.7 60.2%
1955 1,596.3 995.2 601.1 62.3
1956 1,908.6 1,175.8 732.8 61.6
1957 2,179.6 1,370.2 809.4 62.9
1958 2,522.8 1,503.7 1,019.1 59.6
1959 2,447.8 1,706.6 741.2 69.7
1960 3,220.5 1,975.5 1,245.0 61.3
1961 4,361.1 2,144.9 2,216.2 49.2
1962 5,123.2 2,466.0 2,657.2 48.1
1963 6,007.1 2,926.1 3,081.0 48.7
Total 30,660.6 17,042.9 13,617.7 55.65 **
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 211 (1963), and CAB [DEc. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 39.
1963 decade, Pan American provided 65.7o of the total capacity generated
by the two American carriers. During the same period, Pan American's
transatlantic operations comprised 27.6% of the passenger capacity offered
by the entire United States international industry. The transatlantic serv-
1966]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ices also absorbed 43% of the total capacity offered by Pan American
during the decade. Table 11 shows that since 1960, Pan American has
found it increasingly difficult to fill its aircraft on the transatlantic route.
The carrier's passenger load factor for this area has dropped from 61.3%
in 1960, to 48.7% in 1963. During the decade, Pan American's trans-
atlantic operations resulted in 29.3% of the unutilized seat miles flown
by the entire industry.
Pan American's transpacific route includes: (1) flights originating in
the United States, via Hawaii, to the Orient; (2) polar flights from San
Francisco to Tokyo; and (3) flights via Hawaii to the South Pacific and
Australasia. The carrier's first transpacific flight occurred in 1935 when
a Pan American "Clipper" flew United States mail from Alameda, Cali-
fornia, to Manilia, via Honolulu and Midway, Wake, and Guam Islands. In
a 1946 decision, 7 the Civil Aeronautics Board certified Pan American to
develop routes branching from Hawaii to Australia, Manilia, and Japan.
A further branch route extending from Hawaii through South Asia con-
nected Pan American's Pacific route with the carrier's Atlantic route
system.
TABLE 12
PAN AMERICAN: TRANSPACIFIC OPERATIONS UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 809.7 5] .5.2 294.5 63.6%
1955 956.3 663.0 293.3 69.3
1956 1,144.7 8]L7.3 327.4 71.4
1957 1,272.9 902.3 370.6 70.9
1958 1,183.7 805.2 378.5 68.0
1959 1,397.4 1,029.3 368.1 73.7
1960 2,108.7 1,411.7 697.0 66.9
1961 2,525.4 1,572.2 753.2 62.3
1962 2,915.2 1,73 5.9 1,179.3 59.5
1963 3,267.9 1,9:;1.1 1,317.8 59.7
Total 17,581.9 11,403.2 6,179.7 64.9 7o
* Scheduled services. * * Ten year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 213 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 40.
Thus, by 1946, Pan American's present, world-wide route system had
been essentially completed. Table 12 shows that Pan American has achieved
its highest passenger load factors during the 1964-1963 decade in the
Pacific area. In fact, with the exception of recent years, the company has
"
7Northwest Airlines, Inc., Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 209, 213 (1946). This is the decision which
certified Northwest to operate a Pacific route system.
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been able to maintain a load factor in excess of 65 % on transpacific opera-
tions, a remarkable performance relative to the experience of the other
eight firms of the international air transport industry. During the 1954-
1963 decade, Pan American's transpacific operations provided 15.8% of
the total passenger capacity generated by the entire industry.
8. Trans World Airlines
In the 1946 North Atlantic case, the CAB certified TWA to begin
servicing the transatlantic route, and thereby to provide competition to
Pan American in that area. In this case TWA was awarded the "southern"
transatlantic route, and was certified to provide flights to most of the
major European and Asian cities which the carrier presently serves. In
1956, TWA was granted a route extension beyond India to Bangkok and
Manila. This 1956 extension connected TWA's route system with that of
Northwest Airlines, providing a second American-flag, round-the-world
routeS8
TABLE 13
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY2'
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 897.2 574.0 323.2 64.0%
1955 937.2 610.7 326.5 65.2
1956 1,086.4 673.8 412.6 62.0
1957 1,117.3 699.9 417.4 62.6
1958 1,379.8 747.9 631.9 54.2
1959 1,126.1 622.8 503.3 59.7
1960 1,765.2 1,039.2 726.0 58.9
1961 1,913.4 904.5 1,008.9 47.3
1962 2,439.9 1,194.1 1,245.8 48.9
1963 3,338.3 1,564.1 1,774.2 46.9
Total 16,000.8 8,631.0 7,369.8 53.9% **
* Scheduled services. ** Ten year average.
SoURcE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 218 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 42.
Table 13 shows that during the 1954-1963 period, TWA provided
over 16 billion seat miles; this figure represented 14.4% of the total
capacity flown by the industry during the decade. However, as the table
indicates, TWA has experienced a very rapid growth in its international
operations. Because of this growth, by 1963 the carrier provided 16.5%
of the passenger capacity offered by the industry, a figure significantly
higher than its ten year proportion of total industry capacity. A final
"Trans World Airlines, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24 C.A.B. 287 (1956).
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notable feature of Table 13 is the tremendous decrease in TWA's passenger
load factors between 1960 and 1961. Much of the blame for the problems
of TWA since 1960 (and thus much of the blame for TWA's lower
passenger load factor since that time) has been heaped upon the shoulders
of the major stockholder of the firm, Mr. Howard Hughes. Charging
that Hughes has mismanaged the airline during the 1950s, prospective
lenders forced Hughes to surrender control of TWA in 1960 as a condi-
tion for the advancement of a $165 million loan to the company. Presently,
however, there is some indication that Hughes may eventually regain con-
trol of TWA as the company is apparently on the road back to operational
and financial success.8s
9. Western Air Lines
Western's international services are limited to flights from (1) Great
Falls, Montana, to Calgary, Alberta, and (2) from San Diego and Los
Angeles to Mexico City. In the 1946 Latin American case, the Board argued
that additional service should be offered to Mexico City, via Los Angeles,
but concluded that Pan American should be awarded the certificate. None-
theless, President Truman overruled the Board's judgment and granted
the certificate to Western. Table 14 shows that since 1958 the company
has been quite successful in maintaining a relatively high passenger load
TABLE 14
WESTERN AIR LINES UNUTILIZED CAPACITY*
1954-1963
Total Total Total Passenger
Year Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
1954 Western began its international services in 1957: the company's first
195 5 complete year of international services was 1958.
1956
1957
1958 50.1 25.9 24.2 51.8%
1959 129.4 82.9 46.5 64.1
1960 129.7 83.0 46.7 64.0
1961 143.8 83.8 60.0 58.3
1962 168.5 123.8 44.7 73.5
1963 223.4 153.4 70.0 68.7
Total 844.9 552.8 292.1 65.47*O
* Scheduled services. * Six year average.
SOURCE: Compiled from U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HAND-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 221 (1963), and CAB [DEC. 1963] AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC
STATISTICS 43.
85 During the year ending August 1964, TWA increased its international passenger load factor
to 52.4% from 46.4% during the preceding year. For a lively discussion of the interesting, though
perhaps not too relevant, dispute between TWA and Howard Hughes, see The World's Second
Largest Airline, Cartel, June 1963, pp. 29-31.
[Vol. 32
OVERCAPACITY IN AIR TRANSPORT
factor. In fact, excluding 1958 operations, the carrier's average load
factor exceeded 67%. Between 1958 and 1963, Western provided .8 billion
seat miles, or less than 1% of the total capacity offered by the entire in-
dustry.
The foregoing discussion has provided a company-by-company analysis
of relevant traffic statistics for the United States international industry
during the 1954-1963 decade. Two important factors which have been
discussed above should be emphasized.
First, the above discussion demonstrates the extent to which the opera-
tions of Pan American and TWA dominate the international air transport
industry. These two carriers provided almost 80% of the industry's total
passenger capacity during the 1954-1963 period, and their combined
operations resulted in almost 76% of the unutilized seat miles flown by
the industry during the decade. In fact, the two carriers' transatlantic
operations alone accounted for almost one half of the total capacity offered
by the industry during 1954-1963, and about the same proportion of
the industry's unutilized seat miles.
The second factor which is of importance is that the capacity utiliza-
tion for each of the nine carriers is apparently correlated to some extent
with the geographic area the carrier services. In general, the combined
operations of carriers serving the Latin American and transpacific routes
resulted in higher ten year load factors than the combined operations of
carriers servicing the transatlantic market. The extent to which passenger
load factors varied among carriers serving different geographic areas is
analyzed below.
B. The Incidence Of Unutilized Capacity In Specific Market Areas
The total operations of the industry can be divided into three broad
geographic areas. The first area is defined here as the "Latin American"
area and includes services to all points in Mexico, Central America, the
Caribbean area, and South America. The second area is defined as the
"transatlantic" area and includes the industry's services between the
United States and Western Europe, Southern Europe, Africa, and the Mid-
East. (Also included in the transatlantic area are TWA flights, via Western
Europe, to the Near East.) Finally, the "transpacific" area includes services
from the United States to Hawaii, the Far East, Australasia, and Southeast
Asia.
Three of the carriers in the industry (American, Eastern, and Western)
provide international services into more than one of the geographic areas
outlined above. Thus, the operations of these carriers will not be included
in the analysis below. However, five of the six remaining firms (Braniff,
Delta, Northwest, Panagra, and TWA) operate on routes which are con-
fined to one of the three geographic areas. Finally, data describing Pan
American's operations are conveniently separated by the Civil Aeronautics
Board into figures representing that carrier's services to each of the three
areas.
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Pan American and TWA operate in the transatlantic area; Braniff,
Delta, Pan American and Panagra operate in the Latin American area;
and, Northwest and Pan American operate in the transpacific area. Al-
though the operations of three carriers (as well as Pan American's Alaskan
services) have been excluded from this analysis, the operations of the re-
maining six carriers comprised 87.6% of the total capacity offered by
the entire industry during 1954-1963.
1. The Transatlantic Area
Table 15 outlines the ten year operating data for the two firms serving
this area. The two most important features of Table 15 are: (1) the fact
that 42% of the total industry capacity during 1954-1963 was provided
by TWA and Pan American in the transatlantic area; and (2) that 45.2%,
or almost half, of the unutilized seat miles flown by the industry during the
decade were the result of transatlantic operations. The passenger load
factor of 55.0% during the decade on the transatlantic route was below
the industry average of 58.2%, and lower than the load factor for opera-
tions in either of the two other geographic areas. Pan American, historically
the dominant carrier on that route, provided 65.7% of the passenger
capacity, and flew 66.4% of the passenger revenue miles.
TABLE 1S
TRANSATLANTIC AREA TRAFFIC STATISTICS
1954-1963
Capacity Statistics
Total Total Total Passenger
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
Pan American 30,660.6 17,042.9 13,617.7 55.6%
TWA 16,000.8 8,631.0 7,369.8 53.9
Total 46,661.4 25,673.9 20,987.5 55.0%
Relative Share of the Transatlantic Market
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Pan American 65.7 66.4 64.9
TWA 34.3 33.6 35.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Relative Share of the Total United States Industry
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Pan American 27.6 26.3 29.3
TWA 14.4 13.3 15.9
Total 42.0 39.6 45.2
SOURCE: Compiled from Tables 11 and 13 above.
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2. The Latin American Area
Table 16 depicts relevant traffic data for the industry's operations in
Latin America. As is the case in the transatlantic area, Pan American
dominates the operations in Latin America. Of the 28.1 billion seat miles
provided during 1954-1963, Pan American provided over 77.0%; the
carrier also flew 79.7% of the passenger revenue miles in the Latin Ameri-
can area during the decade. Of the three remaining carriers servicing the
area, Panagra has the largest share of the market, followed by Braniff and
Delta. The operations of all four carriers resulted in a combined, ten year
passenger load factor of 61.1%. Pan American's load factor of 63.11%
and Panagra's 59.5 % were significantly higher than the load factor experi-
enced by Braniff and Delta. The operations of the four carriers provided
TABLE 16
LATIN AMERICAN AREA TRAFFIC STATISTICS
1954-1963
Capacity Statistics
Total Total Total Passenger
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
Braniff 2,181.4 1,052.8 1,128.6 48.3%
Delta 1,073.4 530.6 542.8 49.4
Panagra 3,182.2 1,895.0 1,287.2 59.5
Pan American 21,680.0 13,688.9 7,991.1 63.1
Total 28,117.0 17,167.3 10,949.7 61.1%
Relative Share of the Latin American Market
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Braniff 7.8 6.1 10.3
Delta 3.8 3.1 5.0
Panagra 11.3 11.0 11.8
Pan American 77.1 79.7 72.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Relative Share of the Total United States Industry
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Braniff 2.0 1.6 2.4
Delta 1.0 .8 1.2
Panagra 2.9 2.9 2.8
Pan American 19.4 21.1 17.2
Total 25.3 26.4 23.6
SOURCE: Compiled from Tables 4, 5, 8, and 10 above.
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2 5.3 % of the total industry cacacity offered during the decade. Also, the
Latin American operators generated some 23.6% of the total industry
unutilized seat miles during the decade.
3. The Transpacific Area
Table 17 describes the transpacific operations of Northwest and Pan
American. Pan American's domination of this area of operations is
similar to the carrier's predominance in both the Latin American and
transpacific areas. As Table 17 demonstrates, Pan American provided 74%
of the seat miles offered during 1954-1963; the carrier also flew 78.3%
of the revenue passenger miles. The ten year passenger load factor for
the transpacific operations is the highest for any of the three geographic
areas. Table 17 shows that this relatively high load factor is primarily
caused by Pan American's ten year load factor of 64.9%. The transpacific
operations of Northwest and Pan American comprised 21.3 % of the total
industry capacity for the decade, and resulted in 19.8 % of the unutilized
seat miles.
TABLE 17
TRANSPACIFIC AREA TRAFFIC STATISTICS
1954-1963
Capacity Statistics
Total Total Total Passenger
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized Load
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles Factor
(Millions) (Millions) (Millions)
Northwest 6,164.8 3,164.6 3,000.2 51.3
Pan American 17,582.9 11,403.2 6,179.7 64.9
Total 23,747.7 14,567.8 9,179.9 61.3%
Relative Share of the Transpacific Market
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Northwest 26.0 21.7 32.7
Pan American 74.0 78.3 67.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Relative Share of the Total United States Industry
Total Total Total
Carrier Available Revenue Unutilized
Seat Miles Passenger Miles Seat Miles
(Per Cent) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Northwest 5.5 4.9 6.5
Pan American 15.8 17.6 13.3
Total 21.3 22.5 19.8
SouRcE: Compiled from Tables 7 and 12 above.
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C. Interpretation Of The Data
The following principal conclusions can be drawn from the data pre-
sented above.
The first conclusion is perhaps the most significant. During the 1954-
1963 decade, the industry flew 64.8 billion passenger revenue miles, a
truly remarkable achievement. There can be no doubt that these opera-
tions have, in addition to providing the fastest and most comfortable
available means of personal transportation, provided an invaluable means
of communication between the peoples of the world. The monumental
accomplishments of the industry, nevertheless, have been achieved con-
current with tremendous waste. During the 1954-1963 decade, the nine
carriers in the industry flew over 46 billion unutilized seat miles, an un-
utilized capacity equivalent to that required to fly 46 million people an
average distance of 1000, miles! In addition, it has been estimated that
less than 5 % of the world's population has ever experienced an inter-
national flight."0 The present section is not the appropriate place to dis-
cuss alternative methods of occupying these unutilized seats with that
95% of the world's population which has never flown on an international
commercial airliner. However, the combined facts of (1) tremendous
unutilized capacity in the United States industry, and (2) an almost un-
tapped world market for this industry's services, will be dealt with in
Part V where possible solutions to the problem of overcapacity will be
analyzed.
The second conclusion which can be drawn from the data concerns
the industry's passenger load factor. Although this load factor was 58.2%
for the 1954-1963 period, since 1961, the figure has fallen significantly
below the ten year average. The industry's passenger load factor between
1959-1963 was as follows:
1959 .. ......... 65.0%
1960 .. ......... 61.9
1961 .. ......... 54.6
1962 .. ......... 53.9
1963 .. ......... 52.6
An analysis of Tables 3-16 reveals that the fall in the passenger load factor
between 1959-1963 is accounted for to a great extent by the transatlantic
operations of Pan American and TWA. The extent to which the trans-
atlantic operations of these two carriers have influenced the industry load
factor since 1959 can be demonstrated by comparing the data above with
the 1959-1963 operations of the industry exclusive of Pan American and
TWA transatlantic operations. The passenger load factor for the 1959-
1963 period experienced by the rest of the industry is as follows:"
1959 .. ......... 64.1%
1960 .. ......... 63.0
1961 .. ......... 59.3
"Lord Brabazon, 1962 IATA Paper, IATA BULLETIN 105-11 (1963).
"1 These figures are compiled from Tables 2-14.
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1962 . . . . . . . . . 58.3
1963 . . . . . . . . . 56.6
Thus, during the five year period, the industry's transatlantic operations
have significantly lowered the passenger load factor for the combined
operations of all nine carriers, and, as was pointed out earlier, these opera-
tions resulted in 45.2% of the unutilized seat miles flown by the industry
between 1954-1963. The importance of this fact to the present study
will be emphasized in Part IV, which will analyze the main causes of the
industry's inadequate load factor in this area during the past decade. Some
matters will be discussed in Part IV which have affected the load factor of
every firm in the industry; however, emphasis will be placed on determin-
ing the causes for the increase in unutilized capacity generated by the
transatlantic operations of Pan American and TWA.
The third important conclusion which can be drawn from the data is
that the industry's operations since 1959 have increased the volume of
unutilized capacity to an even greater extent than is indicated by the
industry's decreasing passenger load factor. Because of the industry's
rapid growth since 1959, the magnitude of unutilized capacity has be-
come significantly greater each year. Table 18 demonstrates the effect of
the industry's growth on the number of unutilized seat miles flown since
1954.
TABLE 18
TOTAL INDUSTRY UNUTILIZED CAPACITY
1954-1959 and 1960-1963
Unutilized Passenger Unutilized Passenger
Year Seat Miles Load Year Seat Miles Load
(Millions) Factor (Millions) Factor
1954 2,409.0 59.1% 1960 3,590.0 61.9%
1955 2,460.0 62.4 1961 6,513.0 54.6
1956 2,784.0 63.2 1962 7,806.0 53.9
1957 3,077.0 63.8 1963 9,599.0 52.6
1958 3,829.0 59.2
1959 3,415.0 65.0
Total 17,974.0 62.2%'; 28,508.0 55.2%7*
* Six year average for all firms. * Four year average for all firms.
SOURCE: Compiled from Tables 2-14 above.
In Table 18, the 1954-1963 decade has been divided into two separate
time periods, the first period showing the industry's operations between
1954-1959, and the second period illustrating operations between 1960-
1963. The 1954-1959 period, in general, resulted in an increasing passenger
load factor, reaching an apex of 65.0% in 1959. The 1960-1963 period
witnessed a continually decreasing passenger load factor, reaching a ten
year low of 52.6% in 1963.
While the passenger load factor for 1954-1959 was 62.2%, the load
factor for the 1960-1963 period was 55.2 %, or a decrease of 7.0%. How-
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ever, due to the growth of the industry's operations, the 28.5 billion
unutilized seat miles flown during the 1960-1963 period was 58% higher
than the 17.97 billion unutilized seat miles offered during the six year
1954-1959 period. Even more striking is the comparison of the unutilized
seat miles provided in 1962 and 1963 with the unutilized seat miles pro-
vided in the entire 1954-1959 period. During 1962-1963, the industry
flew 17.7 billion empty seat miles, just .2 billion less than the number of
empty seat miles flown during the entire six year 1954-1959 era. The
conclusion is obvious: as the industry grows (and every indication points
to growth in the near future as rapid as that during the past decade), the
passenger load factor must also increase, just to keep the number of
unutilized seat miles at a constant figure.
As we have seen, the growth in overcapacity since 1960 has been the
result of (1) a post-1960 fall in the industry's passenger load factor,
and (2) a tremendous expansion in the scale of the industry's operations.
It has also been demonstrated that the transatlantic operations of TWA
and Pan American account for the major part of this growth in over-
capacity. Therefore, in Part IV, which analyzes the chief causes of the
recent growth in over-capacity, special emphasis will be placed on events
during 1958-1963 which have a direct bearing on the growth of over-
capacity in the transatlantic area.
IV. THE CAUSES OF UNUTILIZED CAPACITY
The three most important factors which are usually invoked to explain
the rapid growth in overcapacity since 1958 are the following:"2 (1) the
Board's policy of "multiple designation" or "limited competition" on
international routes; (2) the industry's substitution of jets for piston-
driven aircraft between 1958-1963; and (3) the increase in competition
from foreign airlines on international routes. Each of these three factors
is separately discussed below with a view to determine their relation to
the industry's ever growing volume of unutilized seat miles.
A. The CAB Policy Of Enforced Competition Among United
States Carriers On International Routes
The Board's policy of maintaining competition among United States
carriers on international routes was established by 1946; and, by 1950,
the present route structure, characterized by extensive competition among
United States international carriers on several route segments, was essen-
tially completed. Thus, to explain the recent growth in overcapacity,
factors other than the Board's policy of regulated competition must be
analyzed. Nonetheless, some authorities frequently cite the policy of
"regulated competition" as one cause of overcapacity in the industry; for
this reason, this issue bears further analysis at this point."
It will be recalled that in 1946 the Board certified additional United
92 See, e.g., Martin, Current International Air Transportation Problems, 45 DEP'T STATE BULL.
684-88 (23 Oct. 1961).93 Ibid.
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States carriers to compete with Pan American in all three geographical
areas. In the Latin American case, the Board certified seven carriers to
compete with Pan American in Latin America. During the same year,
Northwest was certified to compete with Pan American in the Pacific
Area, while TWA was certified to service the Atlantic area. The Board
justified the establishment of its policy of multiple designation by two
main arguments. First, the Board contended that competition among
United States carriers was: "the best assurance that . . . potential economies
will be achieved in operation and that they will redound to the advantage
of the public [only] in the presence of actual or potential competition." 4
Second, in anticipation of growing competition from foreign carriers, the
Board argued that:
the risk that we may commit our resources to the support of extravagant and
unjustified international air services is not so great as the danger that we
may fail to meet the public demand for air transportation, and thereby leave
gaps in the foundation of the future air pattern of the American-flag carriers
through which foreign competitors will be afforded an attractive opportunity
to supply the services we have failed to provide.9"
Therefore, (1) the belief that the traveling public would be given bet-
ter service if competition were maintained among United States carriers
on international routes, and (2) the belief that failure to certify addi-
tional United States carriers to service a growing international air trans-
port market would lead to domination of the industry by foreign carriers
led to the establishment of a policy which has been basically unchanged
to the present time. The present task is to determine the relation between
this policy and unutilized capacity flown by American carriers. To what
extent, if any, has the policy of multiple designation caused overcapacity
to increase significantly in the past five years?
When two United States carriers operate on identical route segments,
the service each provides is very similar to that of the other. On New
York to London flights, for instance, TWA and Pan American both use
long-range, jet aircraft; both carriers ordinarily provide three classes of
flights; both serve comparable meals and beverages; and, finally, both
charge identical fares. Therefore, when a prospective passenger, for what-
ever reasons, chooses to fly from New York to London on an American
carrier, what difference does it make to him which of the two United
States carriers he patronizes? To state the question differently, is the cus-
tomer's decision to fly to London, via a United States carrier, significantly
altered by the fact that one, rather than two, such carriers service the
route?
This question arose, in a generalized form, in a recent CAB hearing"
in which both Pan American and TWA, as well as the Board's Bureau
of Economic Research, were asked to estimate the effect of a revised
14 Latin American Case 865.
" Northwest Airlines, Inc., Pacific Case, 7 C.A.B. 213, 244 (1946).
"STransatlantic Route Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 13577 (9 July 1964). Recommended
Decision of Examiner James S. Keith [hereinafter cited as Keith Decision].
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transatlantic route system on the United States share of the transatlantic
market. Both TWA and the Bureau agreed that a new route system which,
among other features, would eliminate TWA services from New York
to London, would result in a Pan American retention of about 90% of
TWA's share of the New York to London traffic. In a summation answer
to this argument by TWA, Examiner Keith stated that "it is obvious that
an arbitrary retention factor of 90% has no reasonable validity."97 Agree-
ing with figures calculated by Pan American, he stated that Pan American's
retention of TWA customers would be closer to 50o. Keith stated that
since:
U.S. citizens have not demonstrated any solid preferences for U.S. flag services
over those offered by foreign competitors, it would appear that the loss of
U.S. flag traffic would . . . more nearly approach Pan American's estimate
than either the Bureau's or TWA's."
According to the opinion, the only way in which the United States car-
riers could maintain their present share of the traffic would be a con-
tinuation of the multiple designation of TWA and Pan American to fly
the New York to London route.9 In fact, Keith suggested further that
the present number of frequencies flown by TWA and Pan American may
not even be enough to serve the public's needs. With reference to Europe's
four major traffic centers, he argued that:
it cannot be considered that the present schedules of Pan American and TWA
are in excess of the U.S. traffic demands or that their proposed service for
1964 under the present route pattern is out-of-line with the indicated needs
of the U.S. traveling and shipping public. In fact, it is apparent that such
schedules, by themselves, are not sufficient to accommodate U.S. commerce
requirements. Thus, the over-capacity prevailing today and which might be
present in 1964 . . . cannot be blamed on the U.S. carriers. Nevertheless,
the problem might be alleviated by reducing U.S. carrier competition below
the needs of the U.S. traffic requirements."9
If this analysis is correct, then, a termination of the policy of multiple
designation on the transatlantic route would (1) reduce frequencies below
those necessary to service the United States public, and (2) result in a
significant loss of transatlantic traffic to foreign carriers."' Ample data
supports the argument that a termination of competition between TWA
and Pan American (resulting in a sole remaining United States carrier
servicing each transatlantic area) would cause a loss of traffic to foreign
carriers. Of particular importance is the fact that foreigners demonstrate
a much greater loyalty to their flag carriers than do United States citizens.
"I Id. at 97.
9 1id. at 98.
"Id. at 100.
"0°id. at 101-02. (Emphasis added.)
'o' It should be noted here that Keith's argument concerned the Staff proposal under which Pan
American would service a "northern" transatlantic route and TWA would service a "southern"
route. Keith did not address himself directly to the question of how effective would be a merger
between TWA and Pan American into a single "chosen instrument" to service the transatlantic
route. Nevertheless, there appears little evidence to indicate that the two carriers will, in the near
future, be able to gain more than about 50% of the transatlantic market.
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The following data pertaining to transatlantic traffic adequately demon-
strate this point:102
Percent of U.S. Percent of
Year Citizens Moving by Aliens Moving
Foreign Carriers by U.S. Carriers
1956 30.7 40.7
1957 3 i.0 42.5
1958 37.7 34.6




As these data clearly show, foreigners are becoming progressively more
inclined to patronize their own flag carriers, while, at the same time,
American citizens have not shown this same inclination to fly on United
States carriers. With reference to a proposal to eliminate Pan American as
a competitor to TWA at Paris, Examiner Keith asked (and answered) the
following question:
On the basis of . . . experience is it likely that TWA would retain 9 out
of 10 Pan American passengers? Even if 100 percent of the U.S. citizens
traveling on Pan American's service to Paris were retained by TWA which,
of course, is not indicated by the evidence, TWA would still not retain 90
percent of Pan American's traffic, since about 25 percent is composed of aliens,
most of whom, the evidence shows would turn to foreign competitors.""
Part of Keith's argument was agreed to by Pan American officials
appearing at the hearing. When asked his opinion of a proposed merger
plan which would have eliminated TWA's morning departures from New
York to London, a Pan American officer stated that:
Based on the traffic that we are currently carrying on this flight, it would
seem that if we, as the sole remaining carrier, are to carry all of TWA's
traffic, or anywhere [sic] near it, we would have to operate more than one
flight on this channel, right today, in order to avoid pushing a very sub-
stantial amount of traffic on to foreign carriers. 4
In summary, Examiner Keith stated that even though "there are fre-
quency and capacity problems in transatlantic air transportation . . . such
problems have no particular relation to whether there is a single or several
U.S. carriers involved in a given market."'°5
Can these conclusions concerning the transatlantic operations of the
industry be generalized to apply to the industry's operations in Latin
America and in the Pacific area? First, with regard to the Pacific area,
it does not appear that a termination of competition between Pan Ameri-
can and Northwest would significantly affect the combined volume of
102 Keith Decision 44.
'o Id. at 98. (Emphasis added.)
'04 Id. at 96. Statement of the vice-president in charge of the overseas division.
105 Id. at 101. (Emphasis added.)
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traffic carried by both carriers. With the exception of the interstate route
between Seattle and Honolulu, the two carriers do not service any other
identical city pairs. Northwest's route apparently was never intended to
duplicate Pan American's; the main purpose of Northwest's certification
was obviously to provide regional competition to Pan American, and to
make it impossible for Pan American to secure a monopoly in that area.
It might be possible, however, to certify Pan American to service the
entire Pacific region, thus establishing a "chosen instrument" in that area.
However, such action would probably not reduce the amount of capacity
'offered in the Pacific area, but would substitute Pan American's services
for present Northwest services. The arguments regarding the transatlantic
area indicate that such a policy may have no effect except to channel
passengers to foreign carriers operating in the Pacific area.
Although there is, compared with the Pacific area, a greater degree of
route duplication among United States carriers in the Latin American
area, only two firms servicing that area have experienced relatively low
load factors during the past decade. Braniff's ten year load factor of
48.31% and Delta's ten year factor of 49.4%, have been considerably lower
than the ten year load factor for the entire area of 61.1%. In the case
of Braniff, this carrier's South American route duplicates to a considerable
degree the route system of Panagra. Delta's services to San Juan are com-
petitive with similar services of Pan American and Eastern, but the carrier's
services from New Orleans to Montego Bay, and from New Orleans to
Caracas, are not in competition with other American carriers. It should be
remembered, however, that the combined services of Braniff and Delta
provided only 11.6% of the total available seat miles flown by the entire
industry in Latin America between 1954-1963. Thus, even if stiff com-
petition from other United States carriers were a prime cause of the low
load factors experienced by Delta and Braniff, termination of their services
would not significantly alter the load factor for the industry's entire
Latin American operations."' Moreover, such a termination could result
in a decreased portion of the Latin American market retained by United
States airlines.
The above discussion indicates that a termination of the policy of
"regulated competition" on international routes would probably not have
a significant effect on the industry's passenger load factor. The most sub-
stantial part of the evidence which leads to this conclusion concerns the
industry's transatlantic operations, yet it was pointed out that arguments
regarding the transatlantic route system could well apply to the industry's
operations in other geographic areas. Carriers servicing the Latin American
area and the Pacific area also experienced an increase in competition from
foreign carriers. A termination of the operations of Braniff in South
America, for instance, could lead to a loss of part of that market to foreign
carriers, or to a situation whereby the needs of the travelling public were
1"The Latin American passenger load factor for the decade was 61.1%; excluding the opera-
tions of Delta and Braniff, and assuming that all other factors remain the same, the Latin American
passenger load factor for the period would have been 62.9%7.
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not being met in the South American area. In any event, the major source
of the industry's overcapacity is the transatlantic operations, and most
of the available evidence indicates that a reduction of competition among
United States carriers in that area would not significantly alter the in-
dustry's load factor.
In addition to the fact that the termination of regulated competition
would not increase the industry's load factor (and might even reduce it),
there is another reason for which such a termination is undesirable. It is
obvious that the industry's total passenger capacity is determined by (1)
the seating capacity of the aircraft used, and (2) the number of fre-
quencies flown by the carriers. If overcapacity is viewed as being caused
solely by (1), then the industry's waste can only be decreased by using
smaller aircraft; if overcapacity is caused primarily by (2), then over-
capacity can only be decreased by limiting the number of frequencies
flown by the industry. To explain overcapacity entirely in these terms,
however, eliminates a third possible explanation, namely, that over-
capacity is primarily the result of an inadequate demand for the services
provided by the industry. This third possible explanation is, in fact, a
fundamental assumption upon which is based the writer's judgment that
overcapacity is a serious problem resulting from the industry's operations.
The United States international air transport industry is conceived by
this writer as beneficial to the United States public, not because it renders
substantial profits to its owners, but because the industry provides a re-
markably efficient means of transportation and communication between
Americans and citizens of foreign nations. Any solution to the problem
of overcapacity brought about by a reduction of the industry's passenger
capacity, or by the use of inferior aircraft, is not consistent with the
fundamental premise upon which this study is based. The only solution
to the problem of waste in the industry consistent with this premise is to
increase the number of passengers using international airlines, and this
solution cannot be effected by a decrease in the passenger capacity offered
by the industry. Any policy, such as termination of competition among
American carriers on international routes, which may reduce the amount
of output offered by the industry would, therefore, be undesirable as a
means of eliminating overcapacity.
Arguments which advocate a decrease in the industry's capacity, for
whatever reason, are probably academic anyway. Most observers anticipate
that the international air transport industry is at the threshold of a period
of sustained and unprecedented growth. In order to service this growing
passenger market, the world's international air carriers surely will provide
a continually growing volume of passenger capacity. Therefore, any solu-
tion to the problem of overcapacity which is aimed at reducing the size
of the aircraft used, or by reducing the number of frequencies flown (or
both), is not consistent with the facts of the industry's future scale of
production. Any solution to this problem must be in terms of inducing
(or enabling) more people to use the international airlines.
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Previous discussion has indicated that due to tremendous recent growth
in the industry's operations, overcapacity flown by the industry since
1959 comprises over 65% of the unutilized seat miles offered during the
past decade. The present analysis shows that recent capacity problems,
at least as the problems are caused by transatlantic operations, have "no
particular relation" to the Board's policy of enforcing competition on
international routes, a policy which was established in 1946. Thus, the
main causes of this recent growth are events which have taken place
since 1958. The following sections undertake to analyze these events.
B. The Effect Of The Introduction And Use Of
Jet Aircraft On Unutilized Capacity
An increasing dependence on jet aircraft during the past six years,
more than any other factor, has caused the industry's passenger load factors
to decrease steadily since 1958. While the Board's policy of regulated
competition on international routes has had, at the most, a nominal effect
on passenger load factors, the adverse effect on load factors which has
been caused by the introduction of jet aircraft is easily demonstrated.
The international' carriers have, over the years, discovered that the
traveling public prefers certain hours during the day in which to travel,
and, in order to meet this demand, it is incumbent upon the carriers to
provide a schedule of frequencies most convenient to the public. Therefore,
as the carriers began to introduce jet aircraft in 1958, it was necessary
that schedules which had proved most popular in the past be maintained
essentially at pre-jet times and frequencies. The effect of jet aircraft on
passenger load factors would probably have been insignificant had the
seating capacity of the jets been similar to the seating capacity of piston-
driven aircraft. Just prior to the introduction of jets, the carriers pri-
marily used aircraft such as the Douglas DC-7, an aircraft with a seating
capacity of 68 first-class passengers or 89 coach passengers. However, in
1958, Pan American introduced jets to the industry by using a Boeing
707-120 on a New York to London flight; this Boeing plane had a seating
capacity of 96 first-class passengers or 160 coach passengers.
As Table 19 demonstrates, the relationship between the industry's use
of jets and the average seating capacity on international flights is a very
close one. In fact, in the absence of any other variables which could explain
the increased seating capacity of the industry's fleet, these data clearly show
that the larger seating capacity has been a direct result of the substitution
of jet aircraft for piston-driven aircraft since 1958. Table 19 also shows
that by 1964, the transition to jet aircraft had increased the average seating
capacity of the industry's fleet to 118.7 seats per aircraft.
For our purposes, the most important result of the industry's pre-
dominant reliance on jets is the added capacity of the larger, faster jets,
and the effect of this added capacity on the industry's passenger load
factor. It is apparent that had this growth in capacity been accompanied
by (1) a similar growth in passenger revenue miles flown, or (2) a very
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TABLE 19
THE EFFECT OF JET AIRCRAFT ON THE AVERAGE SEATING CAPACITY
OF PLANES FLOWN BY THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY*
1958-1962
Percent of Total
Year Average Available Passenger Revenue






* Scheduled services of all United States international and territorial carriers.
SOURCE: U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACcoUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE
STATISTICS 83, 430 (1963).
large decrease in the frequencies flown by the industry, the industry's
load factor since 1959 would not have fallen so drastically."" The data
in Part III, however, showed that the growth in the number of passengers
carried during the post-1959 period was much smaller than the growth
in passenger capacity. Table 2 above included the following figures for
the entire nine firm industry:
Year Total Available Seat Total Revenue Passenger






Whereas the total available seat miles flown between 1959 and 1963 in-
creased from 9.4 billion to 20.3 billion, the passenger revenue miles flown
during the period increased only from 6.3 billion to 10.7 billion. Obviously,
a much larger growth in demand would have been necessary to absorb
the increased capacity resulting from the industry's use of jet aircraft.
On the basis of the data presented above, it is not possible to determine
the precise extent to which the industry's use of jet aircraft has affected
passenger load factors. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that the industry's
assimilation and use of jets between 1958-1964, because of the larger
seating capacity of the jets, had a significant adverse effect on the ability
of the industry to maintain pre-jet passenger load factors.
.. The entire international air transport industry had 227,776 departures in 1959, and only
201,209 departures in 1962. Therefore, even though there was a 10% decrease in the number of
frequencies during the period, total available seat miles flown increased over 100%. In order to
offset the increased capacity caused by jets, the industry would have had to reduce frequencies to
a much greater extent.
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C. The Effect On Unutilized Capacity Of Competition
From Foreign Airlines
Earlier discussion revealed that events between 1940-1946 established
a framework for future development of the international air transport
industry,"8 a framework in which a growing number of nations would be
demanding an ever increasing share of the world air transport market.
At the 1944 International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago, there!
existed a consensus among the world's nations that the development of
international air transport routes would have to be consistent with the
concept of "air sovereignty," a legal condition allowing each nation to
control any commercial aviation rights pertaining to its own skies. The
condition of air sovereignty has made it possible for almost every nation
in the world to demand (and receive) reciprocal commercial aviation rights
to service international air transport markets.
One important result of this proliferation of international carriers has
been, of course, a significant increase in the competition to which United
States carriers are subjected on international routes, and the attending
decrease in the proportion of international air transport passengers trans-
ported by United States carriers. Because in recent years foreign competi-
tion has been a much more important factor in the transatlantic area than
in any other geographical area, the discussion below emphasizes the indus-
try's transatlantic operations.
Table 20 demonstrates that the diminishing share of the transatlantic
traffic flown by United States carriers has not resulted in an absolute
diminution in the number of transatlantic passengers carried by TWA and
Pan American. In fact, this number has increased from 225,297 in 1954
to a 1962 level of 725,337. Nonetheless, the number of transatlantic
passengers carried by foreign carriers increased from 230,851 in 1954
TABLE 20
PASSENGERS CARRIED BY TRANSATLANTIC CARRIERS
1954-1962
Year Foreign United States United States
Carriers Carriers Total Percent of Total
1954 230,851 255,297 486,148 52.8
1955 270,179 314,326 584,505 53.8
1956 328,892 362,702 691,594 52.4
1957 438,956 412,415 851,371 48.4
1958 616,893 438,575 1,055,468 41.6
1959 720,714 481,174 1,201,888 40.0
1960 923,264 611,076 1,534,340 39.8
1961 1,043,072 611,232 1,654,304 36.9
1962 1,247,017 725,337 1,972,354 36.8
SOURCE: Transatlantic Route Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 13577 (9 July 1964) (examiner's
recommended decision).
'0' See infra II D-6.
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to 1.25 million in 1962, a growth during the period of 550%! Increased
foreign competition has caused a decrease in the share of the market
carried by United States carriers from 53.8% in 1955 to an all-time low
of 36.8% in 1962.
The proportion of total traffic carried by United States carriers in
foreign markets, other than the transatlantic area, has also declined during
the past decade. Table 21 shows that the decreasing share of international
air transport carried by American carriers has not been confined to the
transatlantic area.'09 In 1946, United States airlines transported almost
90% of the passengers traveling between this country and foreign na-
tions. However, since that year, this figure has steadily fallen, reaching
an all time low of 49.6% in 1961, and rising slightly to 50.0% in 1962.
TABLE 21
AIR PASSENGERS TRAVELING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
1946.1962
Number of Passengers (Thousands)
Year U.S. Flag Foreign United States
Carriers Carriers Percent of Total
1946 466 72 86.6
1947 721 152 82.6
1948 713 230 75.6
1949 791 267 74.8
1950 818 277 74.7
1951 946 389 70.9
1952 1,041 488 68.1
1953 1,151 563 67.2
1954 1,230 623 66.4
1955 1,508 698 68.4
1956 1,763 879 66.7
1957 1,911 1,142 62.6
1958 2,053 1,349 60.3
1959 2,358 1,706 58.0
1960 2,505 2,071 54.7
1961 2,458 2,496 49.6
1962 2,679 2,684 50.0
SOURCE: U.S. OFFICE OF AIR CARRIER ACCOUNTS AND STATISTICS, CAB, HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE
STATISTICS 529 (1963).
109 It should be pointed out that the data in Table 20 are somewhat different from the data in
Table 21. Table 20 pertains to the proportion of i:he total passenger traffic carried by United States
carriers in the European and Asian areas. Table 21, however, is relevant only to passengers traveling
to and from the United States, thus would exclude, for instance, passengers traveling on Panagra
from Lima to La Paz. Moreover, the data in Table 21 include operations of United States carriers
which have been excluded from this study because such operations are either interstate or territorial.
However, it should be recalled that the nine-firm industry under investigation here provides the
overwhelming majority of United States internaional air transport services; therefore, the data
in Table 21 reflect, to a considerable degree, the operations of these nine firms. In any case, the
two tables reveal the same basic fact: the proportion of international air traffic carried by United
States carriers has fallen due to increased foreign competition.
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It is not possible on the basis of the data in Tables 20 and 21 to argue
that the diminished United States share of international traffic has been
a major cause of falling passenger load factors. It was clearly established
in earlier discussion that the main cause of the industry's increased over-
capacity since 1958 has been the transition to jet aircraft. It can be argued,
however, that the existence of foreign competition has been a partial
determinant of the recent growth in overcapacity flown by the industry.
Had Pan American and TWA maintained their 1954 share of the trans-
atlantic market (52.5%) through 1963, passenger load factors for the
two carriers would certainly have been higher during the 1954-1963
period. If the two carriers had maintained this 1954 share, they would
have probably carried an additional 275,000 transatlantic passengers in
1962 alone. And, it is likely that 275,000 additional transatlantic pas-
sengers in 1962 might have improved the load factors experienced in the
area by Pan American and TWA (as well as the passenger load factor
for the industry's total operations). In fact, due to the existence of ex-
tensive unutilized capacity during 1962 in the industry's transatlantic
operations, the two carriers could have transported an extra 275,000 pas-
sengers without increasing capacity at all.
Between 1961 and 1962, Pan American and TWA increased total
capacity in the transatlantic area from 1,171,077 seats to 1,434,766 seats,
an increase of 22%. However, during the same period, the share of the
transatlantic market carried by Pan American and TWA fell from 36.9%
in 1961 to 3 6.8% in 1962. Even though the absolute number of passengers
flown by the two carriers increased from 611,232 in 1961 to 725,337 in
1962, this growth was not sufficient to absorb the increased capacity.
Naturally, one result of the failure of the passenger market to absorb
fully the industry's increased capacity on the transatlantic route in 1962,
was a lower passenger load factor for the combined operations of TWA
and Pan American in that area.
D. Summary
The discussion above has shown that: (1) The most direct cause of
the recent growth in overcapacity in the United States industry has been
the transition to jets between 1958-1963. Data presented in the chapter
showed that this transition increased the industry's passenger capacity
much faster than the new available seat miles could be absorbed by a
growing passenger market; (2) A diminishing share of the world inter-
national air transport market maintained by the United States industry
may also have adversely affected the industry's load factors; and (3) The
maintenance of competition between American carriers on foreign routes
probably has not been a significant determinant of the industry's load
factors.
This analysis of the causes of increased overcapacity in the industry
since 1958 does not automatically uncover any solution to the problems
of overcapacity. The transition to jet aircraft would have been a necessary
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step on the part of the United States industry irrespective of what was
happening to the industry's passenger load factor. In 1955, BOAC flew
a pure-jet commercial flight from London to New York; and, soon after,
most other foreign carriers began to transform their fleets from prop to
jet aircraft. It would have been impossible for the United States industry
to have retained a competitive position with these foreign carriers with a
non-jet fleet. Moreover, the increased foreign competition on interna-
tional routes is an understandable outgrowth of the legal framework
within which the international air transport industry operates. This
country's ability to expand its own international route systems has necessi-
tated the certification of a growing number of foreign carriers to com-
pete with the United States carriers. Thus, the problem of overcapacity
has been caused primarily by recent advancements in aviation technology,
on the one hand, and by the legal and institutional framework of inter-
national aviation, on the other hand. Solutions to the problem of over-
capacity, however, cannot be in the form of a revocation of aviation tech-
nology, or the termination of foreign competition. Either of these two
actions would destroy the competitive position of the United States in-
dustry in international air transport.
The preceding comments, of cour;e, raise a number of vital questions:
What, if anything, can be done by the United States Government, or by
the United States international air transport industry to utilize more com-
pletely the capacity generated on international routes? To what extent
are multilateral, intergovernmental agreements possible which could bring
about a greater capacity utilization by the entire world air transport in-
dustry? Finally, is greater capacity utilization possible only in terms of
some form of internationalization of the entire world industry, a proposi-
tion which is politically impossible and which can be discussed in principle
only? Such answers that exist to these questions are the subject of the
following part of this study.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Because the United States industry is part of a larger world operation,
it is necessary to analyze solutions to the problem of overcapacity at two
different levels. First, the United States industry can be considered as a
separate operation, the most important economic aspects of which are
regulated by the CAB. By defining the industry in this way, we can ask
the following question: Is the CAB endowed with sufficient power to
bring about higher capacity utilization by the United States international
air transport industry, irrespective of the wishes of foreign governments
who regulate their own carriers?
Alternatively, the world international air transport industry can be
considered as a single operation, over which no individual government
has a significant amount of control. In this case, the Board is assumed
as incapable of unilaterally affecting capacity utilization, and thus we
must consider multilateral action as the only means of eliminating over-
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capacity. The fact that the United States industry can be viewed as
either (1) a separate undertaking, or (2) a part of a larger world opera-
tion, is reflected in the analysis below.
The main purpose of the initial section is to discuss possible unilateral
measures which might be taken by the CAB to bring about fuller capacity
utilization for the United States international air transport industry. The
second section is concerned with more revolutionary, and perhaps more
idealistic, methods of eliminating waste resulting from international air
transport operations. The discussion in this second section assumes that
the CAB is not capable of implementing a unilateral policy which would
reduce the amount of overcapacity generated by United States carriers.
A. The CAB And Overcapacity: Possible Unilateral Action
It was pointed out earlier that the CAB is charged with achieving a
number of intentionally vague and broad goals in air transport. Among
other such goals, the Board is charged with the "maintenance of sound
economic conditions in the industry"; with the development of an air-
transportation system "properly adapted to the present and future needs
of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States"; and, addi-
tionally, the Board must regulate air transportation in such a manner as
to "recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of such transporta-
tion." While it may very well be true that the Board has, in the past,
tacitly defined the "best" air transportation system as one in which the
owners of the carriers receive the highest profits, this definition does not
necessarily follow from the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. A more com-
plete utilization of international air transport is also an objective which is
consistent with the broad aims of the act.
The United States international air transport industry is believed by
all observers to be at the dawn of an unparalleled period of growth; thus
the "supply" of services provided by the industry is expected to steadily
increase during the foreseeable future. In order to increase capacity utiliza-
tion, therefore, it is necessary that a continually growing number of pas-
sengers patronize United States international carriers. Stated differently,
if this increased supply of air transport services is not absorbed by a con-
tinually increasing number of customers, the problem of overcapacity
will become both relatively and absolutely more severe. The question to
be answered in the present discussion, therefore, is the following one:
What can the Board do to enable the United States industry to absorb a
larger and larger proportion of this growing capacity?
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which consumers can be in-
duced to increase their purchases of a particular product. First, consumers
will buy more of a particular product if, for some reason or the other,
their "tastes" for that product undergo a change. And, such changes as
occur in "consumer demand" are primarily determined by (1) consumer
income, (2) the availability and prices of substitutes for the product, and
(3) a host of lesser factors. Obviously, the Board has no control over
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the incomes of Americans or aliens who fly on United States carriers, and
insofar as the ocean liner industry is -concerned (the only available substi-
tute for most international air transport services), the Board has absolutely
no power over the kind of services provided by the ocean liners, nor the
prices these liners charge. Thus, except to the extent that the Board in-
indirectly promotes international air transport (through promotional
speeches, etc.), its control over consumer demand for international air
transport services is limited, if not entirely negligible.
It is ordinarily assumed that a second way to increase the purchases of
most products is by lowering their price. The extent to which consumers
purchase more of a product at a lower price (in the vernacular of econo-
mists, an increase in purchases of a commodity following a reduction of
its price is a "change in the quantity demanded" rather than a "change
in demand" for that product), however, is determined by the "price
elasticity of demand" of that product. Therefore, (1) if it could be
assumed that the demand for the services of the United States international
air transport industry is "price elastic," and, (2) if it could be assumed
that the Board has power to bring about lower international fares, then
it could be concluded that the Board has the power to affect the industry's
passenger load factors.
But, unfortunately, with respect i:o assumption (1) above, it is not
possible to determine statistically whether the demand for international
air transport services is or is not elastic. The number of passengers utilizing
the services of United States carriers: has grown continually for almost
fifty years, and this growth has occurred during periods of price stability,
during periods following rate increases, and during periods following rate
reductions. Whether this growing passenger market has been caused by
the increased popularity of air transport, by the increased wealth of the
western nations, or by the gradual diminution of international air trans-
port rates which has occurred since 1945, cannot be determined.110
Nonetheless, the Board and most of the American international carriers
have demonstrated many times in the recent past that they favor rate
reductions in most international markets."' This advocacy of lower rates
has always been based upon the tacit assumption that there exists a tre-
mendous untapped market for cheap international air transport services.
In the language of the economist, the tacit assumption made by the Board
and by the industry is that the demand for international air transport
"' Recently, one writer, by using "demand curve analysis," has attempted to determine the
effect of fare reductions on the demand for North Atlantic air transport services. The conclusion
to this study is as follows:
[I]t is estimated that the current IATA fare reductions [1 April 1965] will stimulate
substantial traffic growth in the North Atlantic market until about 1966. The growth
rate after 1966 may decline sharply to about five to six per cent if no further fare
reductions are made, but should continue at a much higher rate if further reductions
can be made.
Wallace, The Influence of Price on the North Atlantic Airline Market, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 369,
371 (1964).
... For an excellent review of attempts by the Board and by Pan American to bring about lower
transatlantic fares, see Keyes, The Making of International Air Fares and the Prospects for Their
Control, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 173, 176-79 (1964).
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services is elastic and that a reduction in prices will be accompanied by
an increased use of these services.
In regard to assumption (2) above, the Board's power over rates in
the international air transport industry is a limited one. Earlier discussion
has demonstrated that most international air transport fares are estab-
lished, in the first instance, by the International Air Transport Associa-
tion. And, as has also been pointed out, the bilateral air transport agree-
ments-to which the United States has become a party-ordinarily con-
tain provisions for the establishment of rates in the event that the IATA
machinery fails to establish rates in particular market areas. In our earlier
discussion, however, the emphasis was placed upon explaining the Board's
power over international rates according to the letter of international
aviation law. It is necessary here to discuss more extensively the character
of the Board's de facto power over international air transport rates.
It will be recalled that the Board's power over international rates is
confined to the establishment of either maximum or minimum rates (or
both) of services to and from the United States, and that the Board is
denied the power to establish exact rates for these services. The Board's
power in this area is further limited by its relationship to IATA, on the one
hand, and by the terms of the bilateral agreements on the other. Thus, any
policy of establishing lower rates on international routes (in this context,
with the hope of increasing passenger load factors for American carriers)
must be consistent with these legal arrangements with the carriers of
foreign nations, and the governments of these same nations.
In the most recent statement of this country's international air transport
policy, with which the Board fully concurred, the Government explicitly
stated that it supports a perpetuation of both IATA and the framework
of bilateral agreements which have shaped international air transport since
1946. The best evidence that the Board cannot unilaterally pursue a
particular rate policy is the recent "Chandler Affair" in 1962-1963. It
will be recalled that in this incident, the Board's attempt to lower rates
on the transatlantic route very nearly resulted in the confiscation of
American commercial aircraft by foreign governments. Thus, as long as
the conditions of international air transport are determined primarily by
(1) rates fixed by the IATA, and (2) by the stipulations of bilateral
air transport agrements, it is unlikely that the Board will be able to
pursue unilaterally a policy of rate reductions on international routes.
Lucile Sheppard Keyes, a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of
the Journal of Air Law and Commerce and a long-time observer of air
transport, has argued that:
Given the attitudes of other governments whose interests are involved, it
is unquestionable that no immediate real improvement in the present arrange-
ments governing rates-or in those governing other important economic
variables such as routes and capacity-can be expected, at least without the
exercise of high-level diplomatic pressures to "persuade" other nations to go
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along, a strategy which is presumably unacceptable to our government and
also probably not in the national interest broadly conceived."'a
It seems obvious that an agency of the United States government, or of
any single government, cannot be expected unilaterally to control interna-
tional air fares as it can the prices charged for transportation within national
boundaries. International rates directly involve the interests of more than one
nation because carriers of more than one flag are generally competing on any
important route and because passengers and shippers are similarly of more
than one nationality. Such rates are subject to influence by more than one
nation because international carriage cannot exist physically without the
assent of at least two nations."'
Earlier discussion indicated that the prevailing opinion among the
managers of most European airlines is that a general lowering of trans-
atlantic rates is not in their best interests. Thus, throughout the past
twenty years, Pan American and, in some instances, the CAB, have con-
tinually fought European resistence to lower rates for transatlantic air
transport services. In explaining the role of Pan American as the chief
advocate of lower transatlantic rates, Mrs. Keyes has pointed out that:
A far more plausible explanation for Pan Am's leadership in price reduc-
tions is to be found in its management's belief in the long-run profitability of
low fares and expanded markets, plus the lower cost level which this man-
agement has apparently been able to achieve as compared with the European
carriers-something which may be inferred from the United States carrier's
ability to operate profitably at the same fare levels at which many European
airlines have recently been making large losses. . . . Though superiority in
quantity and quality of equipment has often been cited as a reason for Pan
Am's ability to profit from reduced fares, it seems evident that this superiority
has itself been the result of an expansionist policy, rather than the other way
around. 14
The preceding discussion demonstrates that it is unlikely that the
Board, of its own initiative, can increase the number of passengers who
patronize United States international air transport carriers. First, it is
clear that the Board's power to influence the demand for air transport
services is severely limited, simply because consumer demand for inter-
national air transport services is determined primarily by factors over
which the Board has no control. Secondly, it is equally clear that, because
of the insistence on the part of several European governments that inter-
national air transport rates be maintained at a relatively high level (par-
ticularly on the transatlantic route), the Board is virtually powerless to
produce the lower rate which could act to increase the passenger load
factors for American carriers. And, since the Board cannot bring about
lower rates, it is academic, at least in this context, to assert that the
... Id. at 174. (Emphasis added.) In this article, Mrs. Keyes discusses the effect on the Board's
power over international rates in the event the Board is empowered to fix exact rates on inter-
national flights. She concludes that "it may be doubted that the existence or even the exercise of
*.. [the power to fix exact rates] would ultimately bring about international rates greatly different
from what they would be without it." Id. at 188.
1d. at 184.
4 Id. at 176.
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demand for the services of American carriers is probably elastic to changes
in price.
Thus, it appears that there is no unilateral policy which the Board could
implement that would bring about lower rates and higher load factors
for the United States international air transport carriers. It should be
pointed out, however, that the previous discussion has been based upon
the assumption that the Board currently favors a gradual reduction of
international air transport rates. It is true that as late as 1963, the Board
provided good evidence that it favored lower fares, particularly on the
transatlantic route. Nonetheless, the last two years have been the most
profitable in the history of the United States international air transport
industry;15 and, the immediate future promises an even greater growth
in all phases of the industry's operations. In short, it is indeed possible
that the Board's inclination to alter the status quo will become weaker
as the pecuniary position of the carriers becomes stronger.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the previous discussion is
that no single governmental aeronautical authority can unilaterally bring
about a change in international air transport rates. Though our discussion
has been concerned specifically with the CAB's power over international
rates, it is apparent that the same limitation of power affects every foreign
aeronautical authority. This inability of individual aeronautical authorities
significantly to affect international air transport rates will prevail for as
long as the existing framework of international air transport rate making
continues to exist. One can conclude, therefore, that multilateral action is
the only present possible means of bringing about a significantly higher
capacity utilization in international air transport.
B. The ICAO And Overcapacity: Possible Multilateral Action
The resistance of foreign governments (particularly European govern-
ments) to a lower rate structure for international air transport services
is evidence that these governments evaluate their own air transport systems
by standards such that overcapacity is not considered a serious problem.
Individual foreign governments may and often do support a flag carrier
for a number of different reasons: in many cases, flag carriers are main-
tained for prestige value alone; in other cases, flag carriers are maintained
because of their importance in foreign commerce, in tourism, etc. A young
African nation, for instance, may support a flag carrier for no reason
other than the fact that other nations might look upon the carrier as
evidence of an emergence from industrial backwardness. To the extent
that governments use international air transport as a vehicle for creating
a good "world image," or as a means of exercising political power, un-
115 The increasing pecuniary success of the United States international air transport industry





* 1964 data are for the twelve months ending 30 Sept. 1964.
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utilized capacity which is flown on international routes will not appear to
be a significant problem. Previous discussion has clearly demonstrated
that the CAB finds it more convenient to maintain "good" relations with
foreign governments than to pursue vigorously the kind of rate structure
which could help eliminate overcapacity flown by American carriers.
The argument that capacity utilization is not a primary criterion em-
ployed by means of which governments evaluate international air trans-
port should not be interpreted to mean that foreign airlines have been
enjoying a greater capacity utilization than United States carriers. In
fact, available data very clearly demonstrate that the entire world inter-
national air transport industry has, in recent years, been flying a rapidly
growing volume of unutilized capacity on international routes. Table 22
adequately demonstrates that the problem of overcapacity is not one con-
fined to operations of the United States industry alone. One outstanding
feature of the data in Table 22 is that there has been a continual down-
ward trend in load factors for international operations in the European
area (which would include the transatlantic operations of Pan American
and TWA), and for the combined international operations of the world
air transport industry. The data also show that the most precipitous drop
in these load factors has occurred since 1960. The experience of the world
industry has been very similar to that of the United States industry in the
sense that overcapacity has become an increasingly severe international
problem in recent years.
TABLE 22
SCHEDULED REVENUE PASSENGER LOAD FACTORS* -


















' These figures represent passenger load factors for the second quarter of each year.
SOURCE: 100 ICAO DIGEST OF STATISTICS 160, 162 (1964).
[Vol. 32
OVERCAPACITY IN AIR TRANSPORT
The fact that foreign carriers have also been generating a growing
volume of unutilized capacity on international routes does not necessarily
mean, however, that foreign governments will become more inclined to
agree to rate reductions in order to solve that problem. During 1963, the
world air transport industry made gross profits of $358.8 million. This
figure was more than three times higher than profits received in any
previous year, and followed a $97 million profit in 1962 and a $118 million
loss in 1961."1 These profit figures reveal that to a considerable extent,
many foreign governments are faced by the same dilemma as that faced
by the CAB; their international carriers are receiving the highest profits
in their history while at the same time they are generating an ever grow-
ing magnitude of unutilized capacity. During 1963, BOAC and BEA
(Britain's two government owned airlines) made profits of more than
$40 million; it is not difficult to understand why the British govern-
ment would be reluctant to pursue any significantly different policy
regarding international rates in 1964. It is probably true that foreign
aeronautical authorities will be increasingly less inclined to worry about
overcapacity during a period when most foreign carriers are experiencing
their most profitable years in history."7
It should be noted, however, that whatever attitudes are currently
maintained by foreign governments regarding international air transport,
these attitudes are not unchangeable. As Mrs. Keyes pointed out (in spite
of her belief that any immediate change in these attitudes is not likely),
several factors may eventually lead to a less restrictive environment for
international air transport operations. Specifically, she listed the following
four factors:
First, it is evidently not only United States interests which may be injured
when reductions in international rates and fares are delayed and diminished.
For example, the real value of the United States tourist trade to major Euro-
pean nations is very great indeed; any significant curtailment of this traffic is
a heavy price for them to pay for the maintenance of high-cost airline service
under the national flag.
Second, most if not all major international air services have become capable
of self-support under efficient operation .... Because of technological prog-
ress, this reason for restraint is now disappearing, though it may reappear at
any time if unwise governmental decisions as to routes, equipment, and the
like force airlines to operate at a loss. . . Where a satisfactory supply of
commercial air transportation is available on a self-sufficient basis, it is no
longer reasonable for any nation to justify the subsidization of its flag carrier
on grounds of the "needs of commerce."
1"'Among those carriers operating at a loss in 1963 were: Air France (a loss of $4.4 million
in spite of a direct subsidy of $19.2 million); Sabena (a loss of $1 million and an indirect subsidy
of $5.5 million); and Lufthansa (a loss of $.8 million and indirect subsidy of $.45 million). These
losses may help explain why the three carriers so persistently resist lower international fares. See
107 ICAO DIGEST OF STATISTIcs 27, 34 (1964).
"' During the past few years, France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany have been considering a plan
to combine the operations of their flag carriers in order to reduce competition, reduce costs, and
streamline their combined operations. Recently, the development of "Air Union" (the proposed
new airline) has been delayed by entrance into the Union of carriers from the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. Apparently, the main reasons for this result from the knotty problem of profit
sharing among the merging carriers. See Keyes, supra note 111, at 191 n.60.
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Third, the technology of warfare has changed to such an extent that it is
also no longer possible to rationalize governmental maintenance of a flag car-
rier as a means of partial support for equipment needed for military use.
Fourth, it is perhaps worth suggesting that the prestige value of a national
flag carrier is not what it used to be., because of general public familiarity
with long-distance air transportation under many flags for a period of years.'
Let us assume, then, that in some long run period, the prevailing senti-
ment regarding international air transport will evolve to a point at
which nations are willing to discuss a less restrictive international air
transport framework. In such an event, what can be offered in the way
of suggestions to solve the problem of overcapacity? A modest proposal
is outlined below.
In Part II of this study, the Chicago Conference of 1944 was discussed
at some length. At this Conference, it will be recalled, the delegates from
fifty-four nations agreed to a basic framework for the future development
of international air transport. As a basic part of this framework, the
delegates created the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (PICAO). PICAO was established as an international governmental
organization through which delegations from each of the world's govern-
ments could meet and discuss the various aspects of international civil
aviation. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which
succeeded PICAO in 1947, has played a prominent role in the clarification
of aviation law, in the standardization of international air transport carri-
age, and in the collection and dissemination of aviation technology. Since
1947, ICAO has, of course, increased the scale of its operations as the
number of carriers joining the organization has increased each year. "
Since 1950, ICAO has been associated with the United Nations as one
of the "Specialized Agencies" which operate in close association with the
Economic and Social Commission of the United Nations. Most recent
activity resulting from this association has been in the area of technical
assistance to the underdeveloped nations.' However, except for the pro-
vision of technical assistance to underdeveloped nations, and its continuous
role of clarifying international aviation law, ICAO remains powerless to
affect the strictly economic aspects of international air transport. Walter
Binaghi, President of the ICAO Council, readily admits the lack of ICAO
power in the area of air transport economic regulation:
[I]n non-technical matters, we cannot claim to have achieved . . . much
progress [since 1944]. But the reason is similar to the one which prevented
the Chicago Conference from accomplishing more, namely that it has not
been the wish of the majority of States to tackle the problems of air transport
economics by plurilateral or multilateral solutions."'
"
8 ld. at 191.9 ICAO Bull., Jan. 1965, p. 4. This issue of the Bulletin contains an excellent brief review of
the activities of the ICAO during the past twenty years.
... As an example of this kind of technical assistance, in 1963 ICAO began a study of air trans-
port in Africa in collaboration with the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA). Since 1950, ICAO has provided technical assistance to seventy-five nations. See
ICAO ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL TO THE ASSEMBLY FOR 1963, at 52 (1964).
". ICAO Bull., supra note 119, at 5.
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(Thus the impotence of ICAO to affect the air transport operations of
international carriers is the result of the same framework which renders
the CAB powerless to lower rates on international routes; and, both ICAO
and the Board will remain essentially powerless in this area for as long as
bilateral, intergovernmental air transport agreements shape the character
of international air transport.)
The main legislative body of ICAO is the Assembly, comprised of
delegations from 107 governments, and which, since 1955, has convened
at least every three years. The Assembly has the power to elect a Council,
which is the second governing body of ICAO. The Council isi com-
posed of representatives from twenty-one states, and the duties of the
Council include, among others, the submission of an annual report to
the United Nations and the determination of the Agenda for each Assem-
bly meeting. These Assembly meetings are designed such that outsiders,
including (1) members of other Specialized Agencies of the United Na-
tions, and (2) the general public, are allowed to attend any or all of the
proceedings. Members of other Specialized Agencies who attend an ICAO
Assembly meeting are called "observers," and their attendance and par-
ticipation in Assembly meetings is actively solicited by ICAO. The presence
of these observers makes possible an important exchange of ideas and
information between ICAO and other international agencies. ICAO's
relationship to the public takes two forms. Schenkman described these
two forms as:
a passive one which found its expression in opening its deliberations to the
public, and an active one realized by a Public Information Program intended
to supply the general public with information on the work and activities of
ICAO.12
2
The organizational framework of ICAO, as outlined above, indicates
that ICAO could provide a most valuable forum for intergovernmental
discussion of the problem of overcapacity. Because of ICAO's relation-
ship to the United Nations and to other international governmental
agencies, and because of the public's accessibility to meetings of the
Assembly, ICAO is the logical choice among existing international organi-
zations for a forum on overcapacity. Therefore, it is recommended here
that ICAO, in the very near future, host an international conference on
the problems of overcapacity resulting from international air transport
operations. Such a conference could be held during ICAO's tri-annual
Assembly meeting, or could result from a special conference called by the
ICAO Council. While it cannot be hoped that such a conference would
result in any immediate solution to the problem of overcapacity, perhaps
a more extensive public awareness of the magnitude of overcapacity would
act to redirect the whole process by which international air transport is
evaluated, a process which has sacrificed capacity utilization on the altar
of private pecuniary success and individual nationalisms. Any such "re-
12 SCHENKMAN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 198. This work is the best
available on the organization and functions of the ICAO, and this section borrows heavily from it.
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direction" as might take place, however, cannot be expected to be a
revolutionary one; the present framework of international air transport
has remained substantially unchanged for over twenty years, and sug-
gestions for a "new look" at the operations of the industry will be taken
as absurd by some, and as outright dangerous by others. Nonetheless, no
harm to the existing framework of international air transport can come
from discussion, and an ICAO Assembly meeting is probably the best
available forum in which such a discussion could take place.
It is true that the time that would elapse between a discussion of over-
capacity and the actual implementation of measures to eliminate over-
capacity might be very great indeed. Nevertheless, an ICAO conference
on overcapacity could act as an important "first-step" in inducing govern-
ments to take a different view towards the role of the international air
transport industry in the modern world. Without such a first-step, the
future holds little prospect for a workable solution to the problem of
overcapacity.
C. Conclusions
The writer quite readily admits that no solution to the problem of
overcapacity seems possible in the near future. The elimination of over-
capacity seems possible only to the extent that there occurs in the future,
a "significant change in the attitudes of the governments of the world."
To the extent that change in these attitudes can occur, such change will
probably come, not from the initiative of governments, but from pressure
on these governments by a more "enlightened world citizenry." Gunnar
Myrdal states this view as follows:
My own personal experiences in ten years of multilateral intergovernmental
negotiations convince me that it is unwise to underestimate ... technical
difficulties and the very laborious and time-consuming staff work that is re-
quired to reach results. But the difficulties could be overcome-if the will to
reach a compromise were present.
It is also my experience, however, that most of the time this will is lacking,
even when there is a clear convergence of all the separate national interests
to reach agreement. While in every country there are organizations, political
parties, and pressure groups to defend special interests, there are nowhere pow-
erful organizations to defend a country's part in the general interest of inter-
national cooperation. The special interest groups are left free to harp on the
nationalistic emotions that can always be evoked. As a result, the legislatures,
governments, and administrations usually tend to act in a much more nar-
rowly nationalistic fashion than would correspond to the attitudes of the en-
lightened sections of the general public. And so the negotiators in the inter-
national councils become conditioned to fight fiercely for the national penny,
while losing the commonly desirable pound. ...
For this there is only one remedy: a more enlightened citizenry. What must
be recognized as-up to now-a relative failure of practically all attempts
at organized international economic cooperation should be thought over care-
fully, not with a view to discouraging sustained efforts, but rather to guiding
them more wisely.'
123 MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE 236 (1960).
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Other writers agree with Myrdal that the basic foundation necessary
for international economic cooperation must be a basic change in na-
tional attitudes. Norman Pounds and William Parker, writing about the
problems involved in establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
contend that:
if the political and economic atmosphere in Western Europe over the next
forty years resembles that of the last forty years, the European Coal and Steel
Community (along with most other things in the area) will disappear. No
international organization of single industries can master violent fluctuations
in aggregate demand, nor can it override the political passions that can split
an economic area along national boundaries. The survival of the Community
depends less upon what it can accomplish than upon what it can inspire."
As the previous discussion demonstrates, the prospects for a solution
to the problem of overcapacity are indeed dim. Nonetheless, it is not
necessary that this study be concluded on such a pessimistic note. Con-
siderable evidence has been provided to show that the great majority of
persons concerned with international air transport, including the owners
of the airlines, the governments controlling them, and a considerable
number of lawyers, economists, and other interested observers, have
neglected to include capacity utilization as an important criterion upon
which to judge the industry's operational effectiveness. And, because this
aspect of the industry's operations has escaped the notice of those most
directly concerned, the tremendous recent increase in overcapacity flown
has been either ignored, or considered as a worthy sacrifice for maintain-
ing the status quo in the international air transport industry.
It is hoped, therefore, that this study can provide the basis for a new
appraisal of the United States industry and, even more important, for a
new appraisal of the world international air transport industry. The fact
that a ready remedy to the problem which has been so laboriously analyzed
has not been provided does not detract from the value of the alternative
framework for evaluating international air transport which has been
suggested here. The value of this study, in the words of Pounds and
Parker, depends "less upon what it has accomplished" in terms of offering
solutions to the problem of overcapacity, than "upon what it can inspire"
in the way of efforts toward a solution to that problem.
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